Apprendi v. New Jersey

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466(2000), the defendant fired shots into the home of an African-American family living in a formerly all-White New Jersey neighborhood. A New Jersey hate crime statute provided for an extended term of imprisonment when the trial court found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant had acted with the purpose to intimidate a victim because of race. The defendant pled guilty and the prosecution thereafter moved to enhance his sentence pursuant to the hate crime statute. After a hearing, the trial court concluded the crime was motivated by racial bias and imposed a longer sentence than he would otherwise have received. After the higher New Jersey courts affirmed, the United States Supreme Court reversed. It held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at p. 490.) The petitioner Apprendi had fired shots into the home of an African-American family who had recently moved into a formerly all-White New Jersey neighborhood. A New Jersey hate crime statute provided for an extended term of imprisonment when the trial court found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant had acted with the purpose to intimidate a victim because of various characteristics, including race. Apprendi pleaded guilty and the prosecution moved to enhance his sentence pursuant to the hate crime statute. After a hearing, the trial court concluded Apprendi's crime was motivated by racial bias and accordingly imposed a lengthier sentence than he would otherwise have received. Upon appeal to the New Jersey courts, Apprendi's sentence was affirmed. ( Id. at pp. 471-473.) The Supreme Court reversed. It held that, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) In so ruling, the court limited its earlier holding in McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79. There, the court had embraced the distinction between "sentencing factors," which need not be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and elements, to which such a requirement applies. ( Id. at pp. 85-87 106 S. Ct. at pp. 2416-2417.) Apprendi found the distinction between sentencing factors and elements "novel and elusive," (Apprendi, supra, at p. 494.) and reasoned that the label attached to a particular fact is not determinative. (Ibid.) It explained that the term "sentencing factor" appropriately describes aggravating or mitigating circumstances supporting a specific sentence within the statutory range authorized for a particular offense. (530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19.) However, "when the term 'sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict" and "fits squarely within the usual definition of an 'element' of the offense." (Ibid.) However, the court explicitly declined to overrule McMillan, clarifying that McMillan's holding was limited "to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict . . . ." ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 487, fn. 13.) The court also expressed reservations about its holding in Almendarez-Torres, stating the case "represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described." ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 487.) "Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general rule we recalled at the outset." ( Id. at pp. 489-490.) The court explained that, "the reasons supporting an exception from the general rule for the statute construed in Almendarez-Torres do not apply to the New Jersey statute. Whereas recidivism 'does not relate to the commission of the offense' itself, 523 U.S. at 230, 244, New Jersey's biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the 'commission of the offense.' Moreover, there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof." ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 496.) "Both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that 'fact' in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a 'fact' increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range." ( Id. at p. 488.) The United States Supreme Court explained that a state's authority to legislate facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense is subject to constitutional limitations, and serious constitutional concerns arise when a state scheme keeps from a jury facts that expose a defendant to additional or greater punishment. ( Id. at p. 486.) The court further explained, however, that where the exposure to greater punishment arises from recidivism in the form of prior convictions entered in earlier proceedings containing "substantial procedural safeguards," the establishment of the fact of the prior conviction does not raise constitutional questions concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof. ( Id. at p. 488.) Thus, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, the Court endorsed the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case: 'It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.' " ( Id. at p. 490.) The Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for the crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of Apprendi, Leo Cleveland contends the issue of whether under Penal Code section 654 1 a defendant has a separate "intent and objective" for multiple offenses occurring during a course of criminal conduct, is a factual question for a jury to determine under the "reasonable doubt" standard. Consequently, Cleveland asserts his consecutive sentences for attempted murder and robbery must be vacated because the trial court, rather than the jury, made the relevant section 654 factual determinations and because the trial court applied a standard of proof less stringent than "reasonable doubt." In addition, Cleveland claims the court erred in failing to "stay" his robbery sentence under section 654. Subsequently, the trial judge found that the defendant's conduct violated New Jersey's hate crime statute because it was racially motivated and imposed a twelve-year sentence, despite the ten-year maximum. Id. at 471. The Supreme Court set aside the enhanced sentence and held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. The Court found that the statute's labeling of a hate crime as a "sentence enhancement," rather than as a separate criminal act, was irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Id. at 478. As a matter of simple justice, it seems obvious that the procedural safeguards designed to protect the defendant from unwarranted pains should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for punishment. Merely using the label "sentence enhancement" to describe the latter surely does not provide a principled basis for treating them differently. Id. at 476. The Court further explained that: when the term "sentence enhancement" is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an "element" of the offense. Id. at 494 n.19 . The indictment against Apprendi did not refer to New Jersey's hate crime statute, which provided for an "'extended term' of imprisonment if the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.'" Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)). However, after Apprendi's guilty pleas were accepted, the prosecutor filed a motion for an extended term of imprisonment. Id. at 470. The trial judge thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi's "purpose" for the shooting and concluded that the evidence supported a finding that "the crime was motivated by racial bias." Id. at 470-71. The trial court then held that the hate crime enhancement applied and sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year term of imprisonment on one of the counts, which was above the ten-year maximum for the offense charged in that count. Id. at 471. On appeal, a divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, and Apprendi thereafter petitioned for certiorari, which petition was granted by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 472-74. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case: It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 489. The United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a sentence enhancement statute that provided for an extended term of imprisonment if the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, in committing the underlying crime, acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The court held that due process and the sixth amendment rights to a jury trial require that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the punishment for a crime above the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 2355. The United States Supreme Court held that the "hate bias" statute that provided for an increase in penalty for the crime by two years was a sentence enhancement statute, not a sentencing factor statute, and that, therefore, a jury should have decided the question with the quantum of proof being that of beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 476. The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the hate crime sentencing scheme in New Jersey whereby a judge, after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a crime was committed with a "biased purpose," could sentence a defendant to greater punishment than that prescribed for the original offense. See Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 491. In doing so, the Court set forth the following rule: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. (Id. 530 U.S. at 490.)