In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) the court elaborated upon harmless error analysis by distinguishing between 'trial errors,' which are subject to the general rule that a constitutional error does not require automatic reversal, and 'structural' errors, which 'defy analysis by harmless-error standards' and require reversal without regard to the strength of the evidence or other circumstances. . . . Fulminante characterized trial errors as those that occur 'during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' . . . The Supreme Court cited a wide range of errors susceptible to harmless error analysis. According to the Supreme Court, "the common thread connecting those cases is that each involved 'trial error'--error which occurred during the presentation of the case . . . ." ( Id. at p. 307.) An error in the trial process itself does not require automatic reversal because a court may quantitatively assess such an error in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 307-308.) In applying harmless error analysis to these many different constitutional violations, the court explained the harmless error doctrine is "essential to preserve the 'principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.' " ( Id. at p. 308.) A majority of the Court determined that an involuntary confession was subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 285 (opinion of White, J., for the Court). In reaching this conclusion, a different majority explained the nature of "'trial error' -- error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 307-08 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court). In doing so, the Court recognized many "trial errors" of constitutional import that did not require reversal. Id. at 308. The Court noted, however, the marked differences between "trial errors," which are subject to harmless error analysis, and "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards." Id. at 309. Such defects affect "the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end." Id. The Court noted specific examples of constitutional errors that would not fall under a harmless error category: total deprivation of right to counsel, a biased judge, unlawful exclusion of members of a defendant's race from a grand jury, the right to self-representation, and the right to a public trial. Id. at 310. The Court further explained: Each of these constitutional deprivations is a similar structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair. Id. The United States Supreme Court held the following trial mechanisms are structural defects and therefore defy analysis by harmless error standards: denial of counsel; denial of an impartial judge; denial of the right of self-representation; denial of the right to a public trial; denial of the right to trial by a jury by the giving of a defective reasonable doubt instruction. (Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 309-310.) The court in Fulminante went on to indicate numerous United States Supreme Court decisions that have applied the federal constitutional harmless error rule in a variety of contexts, including violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, ultimately holding that the admission of an involuntary confession is not the type of error which "'transcends the criminal process'" such that it can be classified as a structural defect, and harmless error analysis is appropriate. (Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 306-307.)