In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the defendant BMW, a national distributor of automobiles, implemented a nationwide policy of not advising its dealers, and hence its customers, of predelivery damage to new cars when the costs of repair amounted to less than 3 percent of the car's suggested retail price. (Id. at p. 562.) The plaintiff sued BMW for compensatory and punitive damages after discovering that his new car had been repainted, without his knowledge, for a cost of about 1.5 percent of its price. (Id. at pp. 563-564.) The plaintiff was awarded punitive damages in the amount of $ 4 million, which the Alabama Supreme Court reduced to $ 2 million. (Id. at pp. 564, 567.) Although BMW introduced evidence that its nondisclosure policy was consistent with the laws of roughly 25 states (BMW, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 565), the plaintiff argued that the large punitive damages award was necessary to induce BMW to change its nationwide policy. (Id. at p. 572.) In rejecting this argument, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the lawmakers of the 50 states made different policy judgments regarding the disclosure obligations of automobile distributors. (Id. at pp. 569-570.) The court further stated that under "principles of state sovereignty and comity . . . a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States. . . . By attempting to alter BMW's nationwide policy, Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of other States. . . . Alabama does not have the power, however, to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor may Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions." (Id. at pp. 572-573.) The Supreme Court concluded that substantive due process principles were fully applicable in reviewing an award of punitive damages in a state court. The Court concluded that three guideposts should be utilized in considering such an award: The degree of reprehensibility of the offending conduct; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by plaintiff and his punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized. Id. at 575. Applying those principles, the Court set aside a punitive damages award of $ 2,000,000 received by plaintiff Gore who, shortly after purchasing a new BMW, discovered it had been repainted prior to sale to repair damage it received in the course of shipment from the factory; the cost of repainting was $ 601.37 and Gore presented testimony the repainting diminished the value of his car by $ 4,000. The Supreme Court set forth three factors for consideration in determining whether a punitive damage award is "grossly excessive" (id. at 562) in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) a comparison of the amount of the punitive damages award with the amount to the "civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct" (id. at 583); (2) a comparison of the amount of punitive damages "to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff" (id. at 580); (3) "the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct" (id. at 575) The Supreme Court held that punitive damages are properly imposed to "further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition" and that only if an award is "grossly excessive" in relation to such interests does it violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at p. 568 at p. 822.) The Supreme Court held a punitive damage award of $ 2 million was excessive where the plaintiff sustained only $ 4,000 in actual damages when he purchased a car without notice the car had been repainted prior to sale. The Supreme Court set forth three "guideposts" for courts to use in determining whether a punitive damage award is excessive: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct; 2) the ratio of punitive damages to the harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and 3) the comparison to civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. (Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at pp. 575-584.) The United States Supreme Court set out three guideposts to determine whether a punitive damage award is grossly excessive: (1) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio between the punitive damages award and the harm or potential harm resulting from the defendant's conduct; (3) the difference between the punitive damage award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. (Id. at pp. 574-575.) The Court noted certain "guideposts" to assist its determination whether the defendant had received adequate notice of the severity of the penalty that might be imposed on it. Those were "the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by plaintiff and his punitive damages award; and the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." ( BMW, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 575.) As noted, however, the ultimate question is whether the award is grossly excessive in relation to the interests the state seeks to protect through the award. ( Id. at p. 568.) The BMW court was able to conclude: "In this case, none of the aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible conduct is present. The harm BMW inflicted on Dr. Gore was purely economic in nature." ( BWM, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 576.)