Berkemer v. McCarty

In Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, the officer stopped the defendant after observing his vehicle weaving on the highway. The officer determined the defendant was drunk, and decided to charge him with a traffic offense. (Id. at p. 423.) The officer, however, did not tell the defendant he would be taken into custody, and had him perform a field sobriety test, which the defendant failed. The officer asked the defendant whether he had been using intoxicants, and the defendant admitted he had recently consumed two beers and smoked marijuana. The officer placed the defendant under arrest and transported him to jail. (Ibid.) The Berkemer court found nothing in the record indicating Miranda warnings should have been given at any time prior to the defendant being placed under arrest. (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 441.) The defendant failed to establish he was subjected to restraints comparable with a formal arrest and the initial stop of his vehicle, by itself, did not render the defendant "'in custody.'" (Ibid.) Berkemer noted the time between the stop and the arrest was short, and at no point during that interval was the defendant told his detention would not be temporary. (Id. at pp. 441-442.) The officer never communicated his intention to arrest the defendant even though he apparently decided he would do so as soon as the defendant exited his vehicle. Berkemer held the officer's unarticulated plan was not relevant in deciding whether the suspect was in custody because the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. (Id. at p. 442.) The Supreme Court also found no custodial interrogation based on other aspects of the officer's interaction with the defendant. A single police officer asked the defendant "a modest number of questions and requested him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists." (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 442.) The Court held the interaction could not be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest and concluded the defendant was not taken into custody for purpose of Miranda until the officer arrested him. Accordingly, the defendant's statements made prior to the arrest were admissible against him. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court stated that the "noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered three characteristics of an ordinary traffic stop which justified such a holding. First, the Court found the detention is usually "temporary and brief." Id. at 437. Second, the stop is performed in a public place. Id. Third, "the detained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two" officers, thus making the stop less "police dominated." Id. at 438-39. Finally, the Court likened the traffic stop detention to that of a "Terry stop." See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The Court reasoned that these characteristics led the detention to be "comparatively non-threatening"; and thus not "subject to the dictates of Miranda." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that although a traffic stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such traffic stops typically are brief, unlike a prolonged station house interrogation, and further, that such traffic stops commonly occur in the public view, in an atmosphere far less "police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself. Id. at 436-39. The detained motorist's freedom of action was not curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." Id. at 440. Accordingly, the defendant was not entitled to a recitation of his constitutional rights prior to arrest, and his roadside responses to questioning were admissible. Id. Justice Marshall, writing the opinion for the Supreme Court, drew a sharp distinction between those circumstances where an interrogation is exposed to public view, such as a traffic stop or other circumstance where the ability of the unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements is reduced, and those circumstances where interrogations take place in "police dominated surroundings" similar to the interrogation at issue in Miranda. In fact, in Berkemer, the Supreme Court held that station house interrogations are the standard against which all potentially custodial situations are to be measured. 468 U.S. at 438. The United States Supreme Court held that roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should not be considered custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda. ( Berkemer, supra, at pp. 436, 438.) The court explained that a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief, and the circumstances associated with a routine traffic stop "are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police" because it is in public. ( Id., at p. 438.) The court illustrated, "Passersby, on foot or in other cars, witness the interaction of officer and motorist. This exposure to public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse. The fact that the detained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two policemen further mutes his sense of vulnerability. In short, the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself . . . ." ( Id., at pp. 438-439.) The Court considered whether Miranda warnings were required during a traffic stop at which the officer administered a field sobriety test. (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 422-423.) The court held that "ordinary traffic stops" were analogous to Terry stops ( Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1), in which "a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose 'observations lead him reasonably to suspect' that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to 'investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.' 'The stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation." ' Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And, unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released. The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 439-440.) The United States Supreme Court concluded that an officer's roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop did not constitute custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 435-440.) The Court noted that the "detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief." (Id. at p. 437.) The court then contrasted a stationhouse interrogation, "which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek." (Id. at pp. 437-438.) The high court addressed the application of the Miranda decision to roadside questioning of motorists detained during routine traffic stops. Specifically, the high court addressed the issue whether such questioning should be considered "custodial interrogation." ( Berkemer, supra, at p. 435.) The Berkemer court initially acknowledged a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle, and further recognized the stopping of an automobile and the detaining of its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. ( Berkemer, supra, at pp. 436-437.) The court cautioned that strict enforcement of Miranda is required "only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated," and the issue becomes whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair the free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination to require Miranda warnings. ( Berkemer, supra, at p. 437.) Noting the usual traffic stop is more analogous to the brief investigative detention known as a "Terry stop" (discussed, ante) than to a formal arrest, the high court in Berkemer held that roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a similarly noncoercive, routine traffic stop does not constitute "custodial interrogation" for the purposes of the Miranda rule. (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 440.) Of particular significance to the instant appeal, the high court in Berkemer explained that "the comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda." (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 440.) The Berkemer court reasoned that two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger a person who is questioned during such a detention will be induced to speak where he or she would not otherwise do so freely. First, an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation in that the vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes, and a motorist's expectations upon seeing a police officer's light flashing from behind are that he or she will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks the motorist's license and registration, that a citation may be given, but that he or she will most likely be allowed to leave. (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 437-438.) Second, the atmosphere surrounding the ordinary traffic stop is substantially less "police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of incommunicado interrogation at issue in Miranda because the traffic stop is public, at least to some degree, and this exposure to public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous police officer to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear of being subjected to abuse if he or she does not cooperate. ( Berkemer, supra, at pp. 438-439.) The Supreme Court held that roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute "custodial interrogation" that must be preceded by Miranda warnings. The Court recognized that "a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver and the passengers." Id. at 436. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a traffic stop does not "exert upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights." Id. at 437. In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed to "two features of an ordinary traffic stop that mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced 'to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.'" Ibid. First, "a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief" and thus "questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek." Id. at 437-38. Second, "the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree," which "reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse." Id. at 438. The Court in Berkemer also analogized the "usual traffic stop" to a "Terry stop": In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest. Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose "observations lead him reasonably to suspect" that a particular person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to "investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). . . . The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 334-35. The U.S. Supreme Court held that roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop did not constitute "custodial interrogation" for purposes of the Miranda rule, so that pre-arrest statements the motorist made in answer to such questioning were admissible against the motorist. If that person "thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Id. at 440. The Supreme Court held that a person temporarily detained on a routine traffic stop is not necessarily in custody for the purposes of Miranda. There the Court found no custodial interrogation in the officer's questioning of a motorist upon a traffic stop, observing that "respondent has failed to demonstrate that, at any time between the initial stop and the arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." (Id. at 441.)