In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) the prosecutor charged the defendant with a felony when the latter availed himself of de novo review of his initial conviction of a misdemeanor for the same conduct. He received a sentence of five to seven years for the felony compared to the 6-month sentence he had received for the misdemeanor. On these facts, the Court concluded that a presumption of vindictiveness arose analogous to that in Pearce because the "prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing." Id. at 27, 94 S. Ct., at 2102. The Court made clear, however, that "the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.'" Ibid. The defendant was convicted in North Carolina District Court of misdemeanor assault. Pursuant to North Carolina law, the defendant gave notice of appeal for a trial de novo in superior court. Id. at 22-23. The prosecutor then sought and obtained an indictment for a felony based on the same conduct charged in the misdemeanor offense. The United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's actions indicated a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" and raised a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness against the defendant for exercising his statutory right of appeal. A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in the Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources before the defendant's conviction becomes final, and may even result in a formerly convicted defendant going free. And, if the prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such appeals-by "upping the ante" through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy-the State can insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial. Blackledge, supra, 417 U.S. at 27-28, 94 S. Ct. at 2102, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 634. After the defendant filed his notice of appeal, but prior to his trial in superior court, the prosecutor obtained an indictment charging the defendant with felony assault arising from the same circumstances as the original misdemeanor charge. The defendant pled guilty to the felony charge in superior court. Id. at 23. Months later, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming that the felony indictment for which he pled guilty constituted double jeopardy and deprived him of due process. Id. at 23. The district court granted the writ. Id. at 24. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the State from "responding to the defendant's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo." Id. at 28-29. In Blackledge v. Perry, the Court confronted the problem of increased charges after appeal. After filing his notice of appeal, respondent was indicted on felony charges addressing the same conduct which had earlier given rise to only a misdemeanor charge. The Court held this constitutionally impermissible, holding that the "realistic likelihood" of vindictiveness justified a presumption that would free defendants of apprehension of such retaliatory motivation on the part of the prosecutor. The government did not overcome the presumption by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 29 n.7 (noting that "this would clearly be a different case if the State had shown that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset . . . "). In sum, the defendant was originally charged and convicted of a misdemeanor. He exercised his right to a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. The prosecutor then obtained an indictment on felony charges, based on the same facts as those in the misdemeanor trial. The United States Supreme Court granted a habeas corpus petition, holding that "it was not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to the defendant's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo." (Perry, supra, 417 U.S. at pp. 28-29.)