Blakely v. Washington

In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree kidnapping, a class B felony punishable by a maximum sentence of 53 months. 542 U.S. at 298. However, pursuant to Washington State law, the trial judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months after a judicial determination that the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty." Id. The State contended that no Apprendi violation existed, arguing that the relevant statutory maximum was not 53 months, but the 10-year statutory maximum for class B felonies. Id. at 303. In rejecting this argument, the Court clarified: The "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 303-04. The Court further explained that under the State's reasoning, "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some additional fact." Id. at 305. Thus, the Court held that Washington's sentencing scheme violated the defendant's right to have a jury find the existence of a fact that permitted a sentence greater than the statutory maximum. Id. at 301-05.The United States Supreme Court clarified its holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," by defining what the Court meant by the phrase "statutory maximum." Blakely held that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." Id. at 303-304. When reaching this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court was careful to clarify that a defendant's right to a jury trial is not violated when a judge finds facts when determining an appropriate sentence; they only do so when they find facts mandated by statute when determining an appropriate sentence. Id. at 308-309. "First, the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on judicial power, but a reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the extent that the claimed judicial power infringes on the province of the jury. Indeterminate sentencing does not do so. It increases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the expense of the jury's traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty. Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the fact do (sic) not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence -- and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement on the traditional role of a jury is concerned." Id. In Blakely v. Washington, the standard sentencing range provided for a maximum prison term for the defendant's crime of 53 months. Because the judge found he acted with "deliberate cruelty," however, he was sentenced to more than three years above that maximum, although the facts supporting the finding were neither found by the jury nor admitted by the defendant. In rejecting the state's argument that there was no Apprendi violation because the relevant "statutory maximum" was the 10-year maximum sentence permissible for the class of felonies in which the crime was categorized under Washington's sentencing scheme, the high court stated: "Our precedents make clear ... that the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the punishment,' and the judge exceeds his proper authority." (Blakely, at pp. 303-304.) After the Supreme Court defined the statutory maximum prison term for purposes of Apprendi as "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,"U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2537, the Court added: "Nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding."U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2541. Apprendi has similar language. 530 U.S. at 487-88, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-62, 147 L. Ed. 2d 453-54. In neither case did the Supreme Court directly address whether such admissions or stipulations must be accompanied by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. But, we think the Blakely majority suggested as much when responding to the dissent's claim that Apprendi could be detrimental to pleading defendants because they would be deprived "of the opportunity to argue sentencing factors to a judge." U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2541. The Court stated: Nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. . . . If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty. Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial. We do not understand how Apprendi can possibly work to the detriment of those who are free, if they think its costs outweigh its benefits, to render it inapplicable. Id.