In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), two black students had taken seats in a section of a restaurant that was by custom reserved for white patrons only. See 378 U.S. at 348. No signs were posted. See id. After the students had seated themselves, a restaurant employee chained off the section and posted a "no trespassing" sign. See id. The students were asked to leave and, when they refused, were arrested. See id. They were charged and convicted under a South Carolina statute that prohibited "entry upon the land of another . . . after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry." Id. n.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the students' due process rights were violated when South Carolina applied a criminal sanction to what had been non-criminal conduct under the statute when it occurred. See id. at 355. As the Court noted in In re Smith, the law had "provided the students no notice that their conduct would be subject to criminal sanctions prior to their engaging in it." Smith, 403 A.2d at 301 (citing Bouie, 378 U.S. 347 at 355). We further cited approvingly Justice White's concurrence in In re Ruffalo which "makes the same point quite forcefully." Id. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, the defendants were convicted of criminal trespass even though they had not received the statutorily-required notice that their entry into the victim's premises was prohibited. (378 U.S. at pp. 349-350.) The state Supreme Court managed to affirm the convictions by construing the statute to prohibit the act of remaining on the premises after receiving notice to leave. (378 U.S. at p. 350.) The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the imposition of punishment for actions that were not criminal when committed worked a violation of the due process requirement that a criminal statute give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A South Carolina trespass statute criminalized "entry upon the lands of another after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry ...." ( Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. at pp. 349-350.) The two petitioners were convicted of this crime even though they did not enter upon anyone's land after being told not to do so. What they did was enter the restaurant department of a store, sit in a booth, and refuse to leave after the manager twice asked them to leave. Their convictions were upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which relied upon a state court interpretation of the trespass statute which "construed the statute to cover not only the act of entry on the premises of another after receiving notice not to enter, but also the act of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice to leave." (378 U.S. at p. 350.) This state law construction of the trespass statute did not exist until almost two years after the petitioners sat in the restaurant booth and refused to leave. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that "by applying such a construction of the statute to affirm their convictions in this case, the State has punished them for conduct that was not criminal at the time they committed it, and hence has violated the requirement of the Due Process Clause that a criminal statute give fair warning of the conduct which it prohibits." (378 U.S. at p. 350.)