In Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942), where the defendants were charged with the illegal manufacture, transportation and distribution of liquor, and each count charged a conspiracy to violate a different penal statute, and where it was conceded that the different violations were all pursuant to a single overall agreement, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there was only one conspiracy, reasoning: "The gist of the crime of conspiracy as defined by the statute is the agreement or confederation of the conspirators to commit one or more unlawful acts 'where one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.' The overt act, without proof of which a charge of conspiracy cannot be submitted to the jury, may be that of only a single one of the conspirators and need not be itself a crime. But it is unimportant, for present purposes, whether we regard the overt act as a part of the crime which the statute defines and makes punishable, or as something apart from it, either an indispensable mode of corroborating the existence of the conspiracy or a device for affording a locus poenitentiae. For when a single agreement to commit one or more substantive crimes is evidenced by an overt act, as the statute requires, the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects. Whether the object of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either case that agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute punishes. The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one. The allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for 'The conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.' A conspiracy is not the commission of the crime which it contemplates, and neither violates nor 'arises under' the statute whose violation is its object. Since the single continuing agreement, which is the conspiracy here, thus embraces its criminal objects, it differs from successive acts which violate a single penal statute and from a single act which violates two statutes. The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it violates but a single statute . . . . For such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can be imposed." The defendants argued they could be punished only for one violation of the federal conspiracy statute since the proof established only a single agreement to commit multiple acts violating several statutes. Id. at 51. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that where there is a single agreement violating several provisions of a single statute, only a single penalty can be imposed under the federal conspiracy statute, no matter how diverse the objectives of the agreement: The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it violates but a single statute, 37 of the Criminal Code. For such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can be imposed. Id. at 54. In Braverman, the Supreme Court noted the appropriate focus of review in a conspiracy count is the agreement, not the criminal object: The precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects. Whether the object of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either case that agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute punishes. The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53. The defendants were charged with multiple counts of conspiracy based on an agreement that would entail violating statutory restrictions on the manufacture, transportation and distribution of liquor. (Braverman, supra, 317 U.S. at pp. 50-51.) The parties agreed that all of the statutory violations were pursuant to a single agreement. The United States Supreme Court concluded that, under such circumstances, there is only one conspiracy, deeming it improper to find "that even though a single agreement is entered into, the conspirators are guilty of as many offenses as the agreement has criminal objects." (Id. at p. 53.)