In Bryan v. Itasca County (1976) 426 U.S. 373, the United States Supreme Court examined the State of Minnesota's imposition of a personal property tax on a mobilehome located on Indian trust land. In an unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court observed that such a tax was precluded in the absence of express congressional consent and held that section 4 of Public Law No. 280 did not constitute such consent. ( Id., at pp. 377, 390-393.) The court in Bryan undertook an extensive analysis of the legislative history of Public Law No. 280 and determined that the primary concern of Congress was "with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement." ( Id., at p. 379.) The court concluded that the provision for state civil jurisdiction was primarily enacted "to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes . . . ." ( Id., at p. 383.) Thus, the court held, the wording in section 4(a) stating that the civil laws of the named states will "have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State" authorizes application by the state courts of their rules of decision to decide disputes but does not authorize application of general state civil regulatory control over Indian reservations. ( Id., at p. 384.) After examining committee reports and floor discussions in both houses, the court noted the total absence of any mention or discussion regarding Congress' intent to confer upon the states authority to tax Indians or Indian property on reservations. ( Id., at p. 381.) Of special import to the instant case is the Bryan court's conclusion with regard to section 4(b) of Public Law No. 280, excluding taxation of any real or personal property belonging to an Indian held in trust or subject to a restriction against alienation, that "even if read narrowly to apply only to taxation levied against trust property directly, 4(b) certainly does not expressly authorize all other taxation of reservation Indians." ( Id., at p. 391 48.) The court in Bryan made it clear that a statute must express congressional intent to abolish the long-standing rule of Indian tax immunity in clear and unequivocal language. ( Id., at p. 392.)