In California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324, 136 L. Ed. 2d 791, 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997), the Court reviewed its holdings as to when a state law refers to a plan. In order to reference a plan, a state law must actually mention ERISA or plans covered by ERISA, depend on the existence of an ERISA plan, or act immediately and exclusively on ERISA plans. Id. at 324-25 (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 121 L. Ed. 2d 513, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836, 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988)). Based on these precedents, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that a common-law cause of action for constructive fraud when one spouse has transferred a disproportionate share of community property to someone other than his or her mate does not have reference to an employee benefit plan. Nor does a common-law cause of action for constructive fraud expressly mention ERISA or ERISA plans, depend on the existence of an ERISA plan, or act exclusively on ERISA plans. In Dillingham, Justice Scalia recounted the Court's struggle to bring clarity to the law in this area, noting that as of the date of that opinion, the Court had decided "no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts in the Courts of Appeals regarding ERISA preemption" and had accepted two more ERISA preemption cases for decision that term. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).