In Cameron v. Johnson (1968) 390 U.S. 611, the statute proscribed picketing that disrupts access to and from public buildings and on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to them. (Cameron v. Johnson, supra, 390 U.S. at pp. 612-613.) The court explained that " 'picketing and parading are subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association,' citation and the statute does not prohibit picketing so intertwined unless engaged in a manner which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to or from the courthouse. Prohibition of conduct which has this effect does not abridge constitutional liberty 'since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to ... distribute information or opinion.'" (Id. at p. 617.) Accordingly, "any chilling effect on the picketing as a form of protest and expression that flows from good-faith enforcement of this valid statute would not, of course, constitute that enforcement an impermissible invasion of protected freedoms." (Id. at p. 619.)