In Carey v. Musladin (2006) 549 U.S. 70, the United States Supreme Court was invited to apply the "inherent prejudice" test employed in Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501, and Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 568, to consider whether a claim of spectator misconduct posed an unacceptable risk of "impermissible factors coming into play." The court declined to apply the test to a claim spectators prejudiced a jury by wearing lapel buttons depicting photos of the murdered victim. The court explained: "Both Williams and Flynn dealt with government-sponsored practices: In Williams, the State compelled the defendant to stand trial in prison clothes, and in Flynn, the State seated the troopers immediately behind the defendant. Moreover, in both cases, this Court noted that some practices are so inherently prejudicial that they must be justified by an 'essential state' policy or interest. . . . In contrast to state-sponsored courtroom practices, the effect on a defendant's fair-trial rights of the spectator conduct to which Musladin objects is an open question in our jurisprudence. This Court has never addressed a claim that such private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair trial. And although the Court articulated the test for inherent prejudice that applies to state conduct in Williams and Flynn, we have never applied that test to spectators' conduct. Indeed, part of the legal test of Williams and Flynn--asking whether the practices furthered an essential state interest--suggests that those cases apply only to state-sponsored practices." (Carey v. Musladin, supra, at pp. 75-76.)