Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) the United States Supreme Court held that certain classes of speech may be constitutionally unprotected. These certain classes of speech include: lewd and obscene speech, profane speech, libelous speech, and "fighting words." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Such speech is unprotected because its slight social value is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Id. In Chaplinksy, the Supreme Court defined "fighting words" as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court discussed the categories of speech the State may prevent and punish, stating: There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument." 315 U.S. at 571-72. Indeed, the Court upheld Chaplinsky's conviction only after concluding that his personal epithets (calling an officer a "God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist") were "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574. The United States Supreme Court explained that "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Accordingly, the court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), concluded that "the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles." (See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at p. 485 "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press".) The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that provided that no person shall utter any "offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name . . . with intent to deride, offend or annoy him" (id. at 569). The defendant allegedly said to the complainant on a public street, "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists" (id.). In reaching its holding, the Chaplinsky court reasoned that "the statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker--including 'classical fighting words', words in current use less 'classical' but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats" (id. at 573).