Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 760 was a civil action involving qualified immunity in which the issue was whether a police officer who allegedly compelled statements from the plaintiff could be held liable for violating the plaintiff's civil rights. The plaintiff claimed that the police officer had violated the Fifth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court produced a plurality opinion and multiple separate opinions rejecting the plaintiff's theory. Justice Thomas wrote the lead opinion. In a section of his opinion joined by three other justices, Justice Thomas stated that compelled statements "of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs." (Id. at p. 767.) "Mere coercion does not violate the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the witness." (Id. at p. 769.) Writing separately, Justice Souter acknowledged that it would be "well outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection" to find that "questioning alone" was a "completed violation" of the Fifth Amendment and declined to extend the Fifth Amendment to such a claim. (Id. at p. 777.) Thus, in Chavez, five justices held that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the extraction of compelled statements. In Chavez v. Martinez, an individual filed an action under 42 United States Code section 1983 against a police officer who interrogated him and obtained incriminating statements without advising him of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436). No criminal case was instituted against the individual, and the statements were not used against him in a criminal proceeding. (Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 764-765.) A plurality of the court ruled that the officer had qualified immunity from liability because his alleged violation of the Miranda prophylactic rule did not in itself violate the individual's constitutional rights. (Chavez, at p. 766.) The Court revisited the distinction between core rights and prophylactic rules in the context of a federal civil rights action. (Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. 760.) A plurality of the court wrote, "Although our cases have permitted the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in non-criminal cases , that does not alter our conclusion that a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case." (Id. at p. 770 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.).) The nature of the constitutional "right" was dispositive because the federal civil rights statute provides a private civil remedy only for violation of a constitutional right. (Id. at p. 766 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); 42 U.S.C. 1983.) The plurality acknowledged the existence of Fifth Amendment "prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause. Among these rules is an evidentiary privilege that protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating testimony, even in noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been immunized from use and derivative use in a future criminal proceeding before it is compelled. See Kastigar, supra, 406 U.S. at page 453 ... ; ." (Chavez, at pp. 770-771.) Similarly, the concurring opinion of Justice Souter identified the core right of the self-incrimination clause as courtroom use of a criminal defendant's compelled self-incriminating testimony, but acknowledged " 'extensions' of the bare guarantee" in the court's Fifth Amendment holdings of Kastigar and Miranda. (Chavez, at pp. 777-778 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).) Although the court majority agreed that a damages remedy should not be recognized for violations of the prophylactic rules, nothing in the plurality or concurring opinions suggests that the prophylactic rules lack constitutional force or are less than binding on the lower courts. In Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. 760, a plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court confirmed that a defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination is protected by the rule requiring use immunity and derivative use immunity before compelling the defendant's statements. (Id. at pp. 770-771 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.).) The court explained: "There are prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause. Among these rules is an evidentiary privilege that protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating testimony, even in noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been immunized from use and derivative use in a future criminal proceeding before it is compelled. " (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court considered a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 by a plaintiff alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Although the plaintiff's statements were compelled, they were never used against him in a criminal prosecution. (Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 763-764.) Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality of justices, characterized the "core" Fifth Amendment privilege as the right not to be a "witness" against oneself in a "criminal case." (Chavez, at pp. 768-769 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.).) But a majority of justices also affirmed longstanding "prophylactic" or "complementary" protections under the Fifth Amendment that arise prior to and apart from a criminal proceeding. (Id. at p. 770 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at pp. 777-778 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).) The rule prohibiting a compelled waiver of immunity is one such protection, and is necessary to protect the "core" right against the use of compelled statements in a prosecution. "By allowing a witness to insist on an immunity agreement before being compelled to give incriminating testimony in a noncriminal case, the privilege preserves the core Fifth Amendment right from invasion by the use of that compelled testimony in a subsequent criminal case." (Id. at p. 771 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.).)