In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), the United States Supreme Court, declared that a canine sniff of an exterior of a car is not a search. The Edmond court noted that "an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics." Edmond, 531 U.S. at, The United States Supreme Court held that a "checkpoint program" with "the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics . . . contravenes the Fourth Amendment." Edmond, 121 S. Ct. at 453-54. The Court reasoned as follows: We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control such as . . . an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by a particular route. . . . While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. at 455 The Supreme Court expressed concern that the mounting number of exceptions were beginning to overwhelm the general rule. "Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life." (Id. at 42.) The Court, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, accordingly, held that a city's drug interdiction checkpoints were in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated: "We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." (531 U.S. at 41.) Her majority opinion stated that it expressed no view as to whether the police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint to search for drugs in a car. Id. at 47 n.2. Yet, the Court stated: "The Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route." (Id. at 44.) As indicated in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra, police dragnets and highway roadblocks are permissible in certain situations. The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality "of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics." (Id. at 34.) In holding the Indianapolis nondiscretionary checkpoint program unconstitutional, the Court stated: "We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse that we would not credit the 'general interest in crime control' as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. 440 U.S., at 659, n.18, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment." (City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra at 41-42.)