In Cole v. Arkansas (1948) 333 U.S. 196, section 1 of Act 193 of the 1943 Arkansas Legislature (Act) made it "unlawful for any person by the use of force or violence, or threat of the use of force or violence, to prevent or attempt to prevent any person from engaging in any lawful vocation." (Cole, supra, 333 U.S. at p. 199, fn. 2.) Section 2 of the same Act made it "'unlawful for any person acting in concert with one or more other persons, to assemble at or near any place where a "labor dispute" exists and by force or violence prevent ... any person from engaging in any lawful vocation.'" (Id. at p. 198.) The information against the defendants charged that "'acting in concert with other persons, they assembled'" at a certain plant "'where a labor dispute existed, and by force and violence prevented Otha Williams from engaging in a lawful vocation.'" (Ibid.) The trial court read section 2 to the jury and instructed on what was required for a conviction under that section. After the defendants were convicted, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the defendants were properly convicted of the "'use of force or violence, or threat of the use of force or violence,'" which was unlawful under section 1 of the Act; it refused to consider the defendants' federal constitutional challenges to their convictions under section 2. (Cole, at p. 200.) The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding the defendants were charged and tried under section 2 of the Act; the trial court construed the information to charge a violation of section 2, and instructed the jury accordingly. "Without completely ignoring the judge's charge, the jury could not have convicted petitioners for having committed the separate, distinct, and substantially different offense defined in 1. Yet the State Supreme Court refused to consider the validity of the convictions under 2, for violation of which petitioners were tried and convicted. It affirmed their convictions as though they had been tried for violating 1, an offense for which they were neither tried nor convicted." (Cole, supra, 333 U.S. at pp. 200-201, ) "To conform to due process of law, petitioners were entitled to have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court." (Id. at p. 202.) Because the defendants had been denied due process, the Court reversed and remanded for consideration of the defendants' challenges to their convictions under section 2 of the Act. (Cole, at p. 202.)