In Colonnade Catering Corp v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Supreme Court by Justice Douglas held that the residential rental business is not a closely regulated industry. Therefore, an owner's ability to rent his premises may not be conditioned upon his consent to a warrantless inspection of the premises. Yet, in dicta the Court found that administrative searches particularly of the liquor industry pre-dated the Fourth Amendment and may have been an exception to it. Further, that the Congress may proscribe laws to regulate that and other industries that are seemingly in conflict with the Fourth Amendment. Justice Douglas wrote: "The Government, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment bans only 'unreasonable searches and seizures', relies heavily on the long history of the regulation of the liquor industry during pre-Fourth Amendment days, first in England and later in the American Colonies. It is pointed out, for example, that in 1660 the precursor of modern-day liquor legislation was enacted in England which allowed commissioners to enter, on demand, brewing houses at all times for inspection. Massachusetts had a similar law in 1692. And in 1791, the year in which the Fourth Amendment was ratified, Congress imposed an excise tax on imported distilled spirits and on liquor distilled here, under which law federal officers had broad powers to inspect distilling regulations governing the liquor industry, it is argued that Congress has been most solicitous in protecting the revenue against various types of fraud and to that end has repeatedly granted federal agents power to make warrantless searches and seizures of articles under the liquor laws. "The Court recognized the special treatment of inspection laws of this kind in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529, 29 L. Ed. 746: '(In) the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an interest in them for the payment of the duties thereon, and until such duties are paid has a right to keep them under observation, or to pursue and drag them from concealment.' "And it added:'The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.' Id., at 623, 6 S. Ct. at 528. "[1] We agree that Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand. The general rule laid down in See v. City of Seattle, supra, 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S. Ct. at 1740--'that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure'--is therefore not applicable here. In See, we reserved decision on the problems of 'licensing programs' requiring inspection, saying they can be resolved 'on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.' Id., at 546, 87 S. Ct., at 1741. "[2] Where Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply. We said in the See case: 'The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by warrant.' Id. at 543, 87 S. Ct. at 1739. "[3][4] What was said in See reflects this Nation's traditions that are strongly opposed to using force without definite authority to break down doors. We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and inspection. As respects that industry, and its various branches including retailers, Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures. Under the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a warrant. It resolved the issue, not by authorizing forcible, warrantless entries, but by making it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission to the inspector."