County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen

In County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), three adult men and a 16-year-old girl ("Jane Doe") were charged with possessing two loaded handguns found in plain view in an open purse on the front floor or front seat of their car next to Doe after they were stopped for speeding on the New York Thruway. In accordance with a state statute, the jury was instructed that the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 142. The Court noted that New York had an "analogous statutory automobile/narcotics presumption." Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 165 n.27. The three male defendants challenged that statutory presumption on due process grounds, claiming that the evidence supporting its application to them failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they possessed the guns. See id. at 147 & n.5, 166. The Supreme Court held that the statute established only a permissible inference or presumption, not a mandatory one. This meant that proof of the "evidentiary" or "basic" facts could "constitute prima facie evidence" of "ultimate" or "elemental" facts, but that the inference was not binding on the jury. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 156-57. Such a permissive inference satisfies due process, the Court explained, as long as the ultimate or elemental facts are "'more likely than not to flow from' the basic facts" and "the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt." Id. at 165-66 & n.28, 167. Evaluating the application of the presumption on the facts before it, the Court observed that "the argument against possession by any of the male defendants was predicated solely on the fact that the guns were found in Jane Doe's pocketbook." But the surrounding circumstances made it "highly improbable" that the handguns were in her sole possession, id. at 163, and assuming that the jury rejected that hypothesis, "the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in the plain view of the three other occupants of the automobile. In such a case, it is surely rational to infer that each of the defendants was fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons." Id. at 164-65. The Court noted that the male defendants were not "hitchhikers or other casual passengers," that the guns were too large to be concealed in Jane Doe's handbag, and that the bag was open "and part of one of the guns was in plain view, within easy access of the driver of the car and even, perhaps, of the other two male defendants who were riding in the rear seat." Moreover, the Court reasoned, "as a 16-year-old girl in the company of three adult men she was the least likely of the four to be carrying one, let alone two, heavy handguns": It is far more probable that she relied on the pocketknife found in her brassiere for any necessary self-protection. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for her counsel to argue and for the jury to infer that when the car was halted for speeding, the other passengers in the car anticipated the risk of a search and attempted to conceal their weapons in a pocketbook in the front seat. The inference is surely more likely than the notion that these weapons were the sole property of the 16-year-old girl. Id. at 163-64. County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, concerned a jury instruction given in state court in New York under which the jury was permitted, but not required, to infer from the presence of a gun in a car that all the occupants of the car were in possession of the gun. (Id. at pp. 142, 145, 160-161.) Noting that the charge as a whole "plainly directed the jury to consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference," the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the instruction denied due process under the circumstances of the case, since there were two large handguns in plain view in a 16-year-old girl's open purse and the other occupants of the car were three adult males. (Id. at pp. 162, 163-164, 167.) It held that an instruction stating a permissive inference does not lower the prosecution's burden of proof unless the facts of the case are such that the inference would be irrational: "Because a permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference." (Allen, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157.) The Supreme Court considered New York's statutory presumption that all individuals riding in an automobile are presumed to possess contraband found in the car, "as applied to the facts of that case." Id. at 163. The Court specifically refused to decide the facial reasonableness of the presumption, see id. (concluding there was reversible error because federal appellate court passed on constitutionality of permissive inference on its face rather than as applied), but held instead that, based on the facts of the case taken as a whole, the evidence was sufficient to establish constructive possession. In Ulster County, police stopped a vehicle containing three adult males and a 16-year-old girl, finding two handguns protruding from the girl's handbag on the floorboard at her feet, where she was sitting in the front passenger seat. See id. at 143-44. The Court found significant that the New York statute created only a permissive inference and noted that the trial court's "instructions plainly directed the jury to consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference that all four occupants of the car had possession of the two loaded handguns. . . ." Id. at 162. The Court referenced numerous facts that suggested the girl was not the only individual in the car able to exercise dominion over the guns, there being "several circumstances" that made it "highly improbable." Id. at 163. The Court then stated that: "assuming that the jury did reject that the young woman solely possessed the weapons, the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in plain view of the three other occupants of the automobile. In such a case, it is surely rational to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons." Id. at 164-65. Although the government contends that this language is an implicit endorsement of the proposition that proximity and plain view alone may support a finding of intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court's decision is not based on plain view and accessibility alone, but on the "several circumstances" it expressly identified from the evidence presented in the case that bolstered the probative value of the permissive inference at issue in that case. Id. at 163-64. The United States Supreme Court held that permissive presumptions of guilt comport with due process so long as they allow the jury to take into account the actual evidence at trial. The Supreme Court upheld an instruction setting forth the permissive presumption that the presence of an unlawful firearm in a vehicle was possessed by each occupant because the jury was free to disregard the presumption even in the absence of rebuttal evidence. (Id. at pp. 161-162.) As the Ulster court noted, the permissive presumption did not deny the jury the prerogative to make an independent evaluation of the facts. (Id. at p. 161.)