In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court specified that "testimonial" hearsay evidence is inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The Court reviewed the history of the Confrontation Clause, explaining that its focus was to prevent the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Id., It explained that the clause applies to those who "bear testimony" and stated that "testimony" is typically "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id. (quoting 1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The Court declined to spell out a comprehensive definition of "testimonial." It did, however, identify three kinds of statements that could be properly regarded as testimonial: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially," (2) "extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,"; (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Id. Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial. Id. In Crawford, the Supreme Court wrote that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Accordingly, the Court held that testimonial hearsay is admissible under the Sixth Amendment only if the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. The Court did not give a comprehensive definition of testimonial hearsay, but held that the term "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed." Id. The Supreme Court concluded that out-of-court statements made by witnesses are subject to the confrontation clause. (Id. at pp. 50-52.) The court explained that the confrontation clause bars use of the testimonial statement of an unavailable witness where there has been no prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. (Id. at p. 68.) Thus, under Crawford, testimonial statements may not be admitted unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the person whose hearsay testimony is sought to be introduced. The test for determining whether a statement is testimonial is not whether its use in a potential trial is foreseeable. Rather, the test is whether the statement was obtained for the purpose of potentially using it in a criminal trial or determining if a criminal charge should issue. (Id. at pp. 68-69.) However, "where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . ." (Id. at p. 68.) The Court determined the Confrontation Clause "applies to 'witnesses' against the accused-in other words, those who 'bear testimony.' 'Testimony,' in turn, is typically 'a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.'" (Id. at p. 51.) The court held that "testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial could be admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." (Id. at p. 59.) The court did, however, recognize that there are exceptions to this general rule. One such exception is for business records. (Id. at p. 56.) In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause prohibits the use of "testimonial" statements made out of court to prove the guilt of an accused unless he is given the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 57.) The Court in Crawford declined to give a comprehensive definition of "testimonial" but indicated that "whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with the closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed." (Id. at p. 68.) The United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Federal Constitution was directed at the use of ex parte examination of witnesses against a defendant in a criminal trial. In a lengthy and historical analysis, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause bars the use of "testimonial" hearsay statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant was afforded a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The term "testimonial," as used in this decision, "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and to police interrogations." (Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.) In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered whether the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment prohibits admission of out-of-court statements for their truth without cross-examination. Crawford held that the confrontation clause prohibits the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement of a declarant against a defendant in a criminal case unless the declarant is present at trial and the defense has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, or the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine an unavailable declarant. The Supreme Court rejected the use of a judicial finding of reliability as the basis for admitting hearsay evidence and required confrontation. (541 U.S. at 61.) The decision holds that testimonial evidence is what must be confronted, but deliberately leaves the scope of "testimonial" undefined. The Court did explicitly describe the "core class" of testimonial statements as "at a minimum . . . prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations." (541 U.S. at 68.) It wrote that the involvement of government officials in the taking of potential testimony or in conducting essentially investigative and prosecutorial functions produces evidence that falls squarely within the class of testimonial hearsay. (541 U.S. at 53-54, 56.) Noting the investigative and prosecutorial functions of government officers, the Court said that the involvement of any such officer in the production of testimonial evidence presents a risk. (541 U.S. at 53.) The Court identified three types of historically based nontestimonial statements: coconspirator statements, business records, and dying declarations. As for the last, dying declarations, the Court questioned whether testimonial dying declarations (as contrasted with nontestimonial dying declarations) were admissible, but stated that even if they were admissible on historical grounds, they were sui generis. (541 U.S. at 56.) The Court rejected the reliability requirement of Ohio v. Roberts (1980) with respect to "testimonial" statements, and held that "where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Id. at 68. Although Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive definition of what constituted "testimonial statements," it did state that such statements included "'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,' 'extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,' and 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. Crawford stated that it was leaving "for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'" Id. at 68. Nevertheless, the court stated that "whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations" since "these are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed." Id. Consequently, the Crawford court held that where testimonial evidence is at issue, the Confrontation Clause requires unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination in order for the evidence to be deemed admissible. Id. Conversely, Crawford held that "where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law--as does Ohio v. Roberts , and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court examined those instances where a defendant has the right to confront witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause bars the "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 53-54. However, "non-testimonial" evidence is not barred; further, the Supreme Court acknowledged the exception to the Confrontation Clause when the Court noted that "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds." Crawford, at 61.