Cunningham v. California

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) involved a defendant who was convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment of six, twelve, or sixteen years under California's determinate sentencing law. 549 U.S. at 275. The law required the trial judge to sentence the defendant to the middle term unless the judge found one or more additional aggravating facts. Id. The trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence six aggravating facts, including "the particular vulnerability of the victim, and the defendant's violent conduct, which indicated a serious danger to the community." Id. Accordingly, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to the upper term of sixteen years. Id. at 276. However, the Court found the sentence unconstitutional and held that California's determinate sentencing law, which "placed sentence-elevating factfinding within the judge's province," violated the Apprendi rule. Id. at 274, 288. The United States Supreme Court held that California's determinate sentencing law runs afoul of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it allows a judge to impose an upper term sentence based on facts found true by the judge rather than the jury. (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 860.) As the high court explained: "The Federal Constitution's jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant." (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court decided in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, that: "Under California's determinate sentencing system, the existence of a single aggravating circumstance is legally sufficient to make the defendant eligible for the upper term. Therefore, if one aggravating circumstance has been established in accordance with the constitutional requirements set forth in Blakely, the defendant is not 'legally entitled' to the middle term sentence, and the upper term sentence is the 'statutory maximum.'" (Id. at p. 813.) The United States Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing scheme under former section 1170 violated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Former section 1170 provided for a determinate sentencing scheme comprised of lower, middle and upper terms, and stated, as pertinent, that "the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances the judge finds in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." (Former 1170, subd. (b); Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 277 166 L.Ed.2d at p. 866.) Based on this quoted language from former section 1170, Cunningham deemed the middle term the legally pivotal "statutory maximum" term, and noted that "the Federal Constitution's jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum i.e., an upper term based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant i.e., a fact found by the judge." (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274, see id. at pp. 275, 293 166 L.Ed.2d at p. 864, see id. at pp. 865, 876.)