Cuyler v. Sullivan

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) involved two attorneys who together represented three criminal defendants. In Cuyler, the Supreme Court first considered whether a state trial judge must inquire into the propriety of multiple representation even though no party lodges an objection. Id. at 345. The Court concluded the trial court had no affirmative duty to inquire into the propriety of multiple representation. Id. at 348. Under the second issue presented in Cuyler, the Supreme Court determined that in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. The Supreme Court stated: We hold that the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id. at 350 The Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties, i.e., counsel's performance is deficient in a significant way. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests, i.e., the effect of the deficient performance. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above, i.e., complete denial of counsel's assistance or various types of state interference with it. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' (Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350.) The United States Supreme Court held that if a defendant does not object at trial to multiple representation, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus the defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest occurred which adversely affected his trial lawyer's performance. Under Cuyler v. Sullivan, once a petitioner has shown that a conflict of interest adversely affected the adequacy of his trial lawyer's performance, it is unnecessary that he demonstrate prejudice. ( Id., at pp. 349-350.) The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Cuyler that ". . . unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error." ( Id., at p. 349.) The United States Supreme Court held that "the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." The court followed the majority approach which had been adopted by federal Courts of Appeal, namely, that the defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his lawyer's performance. (Ibid.) Once an actual conflict was shown, Cuyler reaffirmed the Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) thesis of automatic reversal. (See ibid. ) In a footnote to his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall explained the difference between a possibility of conflict and actual conflict: "There is a possibility of conflict, then, if the interests of the defendants may diverge at some point so as to place the attorney under inconsistent duties. There is an actual, relevant conflict of interests if, during the course of the representation, the defendants' interests do diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action." ( Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra.) Cuyler teaches that it is not enough to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment problem by showing a potential conflict of interest, one of the fundamental elements of the "informed speculation" standard. The United States Supreme Court held that a defendant can establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel if he can show "that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). Four years later, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court held that for ineffective assistance claims not involving alleged conflicts of interest, a defendant must usually show: (1) that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of professional competence; (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.