Dawson v. Delaware

In Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), a capital case, the United States Supreme Court held that the introduction of evidence at the penalty phase of the trial of the defendant's membership in a White racist prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood, violated the defendant's First Amendment rights. (Id. at p. 165.) However, the evidence had no relevance because the victim and the defendant were both white and there was no possible racial motivation for the killing. (Id. at p. 166.) Nor did the evidence have any other relevance; it simply presented the defendant's "abstract beliefs" and there was no attempt to link those beliefs to any factor relevant to the sentencing, or to the defendant's future dangerousness. (Ibid.)The Supreme Court said that the First Amendment prevents a state "from employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried." Id. at 168. The Court held that the admission at sentencing of a stipulation, offered in lieu of presentation of evidence, that the defendant was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, was improper, but only because "the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's sentencing proceeding." Id. at 165. The Court noted that if admissible evidence had been presented that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent escape attempts and that advocates murder of fellow inmates, "we would have a much different case." Id. The Court continued: "Because the prosecution did not prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was . . . not relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstance. In many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. A defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future. Other evidence concerning a defendant's associations might be relevant in proving other aggravating circumstances." Id. at 166.