In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that the right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution "prohibit[s] the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial." The high court explained that "courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury . . . . The constitutional requirement, however, is not absolute. It permits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling." (Id. at p. 633.) The Deck court recognized the need to restrain dangerous defendants to prevent courtroom attacks, and the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations. (Id. at p. 632.) It also advised that such determinations must be case specific, "that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial." (Id. at p. 633.) The Supreme Court concluded that "where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The State must prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' (Deck, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 635.) The United States Supreme Court held that the right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution "prohibits the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial." The high court explained that "courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury . . . . The constitutional requirement, however, is not absolute. It permits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling." (Id. at p. 633.) The Deck court recognized the need to restrain dangerous defendants to prevent courtroom attacks and the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations. (Id. at p. 632.) The Supreme Court concluded that "where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The State must prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" (Id. at p. 635.) The Supreme Court of the United States recognized a due process interest in the use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of a trial. Id. at 629. The court reiterated its holding in Holbrook v. Flynn (1986), 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525, that shackling is "inherently prejudicial" and reasoned that: "visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process;" "It suggests to the jury that the justice system itself sees a 'need to separate a defendant from the community at large;' "shackles can interfere with the accused's 'ability to communicate' with his lawyer;" "judges must seek to maintain a judicial process that is a dignified process. The courtroom's formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual's liberty through criminal punishment." Id. at 630-631. In Deck, the Supreme Court admonished the trial court for failing to indicate any formal or informal findings on the record. Id. at 634. "The judge did not refer to a risk of escape or a threat to courtroom security. Rather, he gave as his reason for imposing the shackles the fact that Deck already 'has been convicted.'" Id. Thus, where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." Id. Since the use of visible shackles implicates the due process clause and "the physical indicia of innocence [is] so essential to a fair trial, except in cases where the trial process is disrupted in the court's presence, a formal hearing should be conducted." United States v. Miller (C.A.6, 2008), 531 F.3d 340, 345. "In this way factual disputes may be resolved and a meaningful record preserved for an appeal or for collateral relief." Id. In Deck v. Missouri (2005), the United States Supreme Court grounded the due process right to be free of shackles in three fundamental legal principles: the presumption of innocence, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the imperative that judges maintain a dignified judicial process. Id. at 630-631. Deck held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase of a capital trial, id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, applying pre-existing rules governing the guilt phase of criminal proceedings. Marquard v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections (2005), 429 F.3d 1278, 1311.