In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 122 L. Ed. 2d 406, 113 S. Ct. 1085 (1993), a prisoner in Indiana was brought to trial in Michigan 196 days after he gave a request for final disposition to the Indiana prison officials and 177 days after the request for final disposition was received by the Michigan prosecuting attorney and the court. 507 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court, in resolving the Fex case, adopted the reasoning of the State of Michigan that "no one can have 'caused something to be delivered' unless delivery in facts occurs," finding this proposition "self-evidently true." Id. Other jurisdictions have followed the holding of Fex and have held that prisoners attempting to invoke the provisions of Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act must strictly comply with those provisions and cause their requests for final disposition of the charges against them to be actually delivered on both the prosecuting attorney and the court of the jurisdiction issuing the detainer before the 180-day time limit commences to run. See United States v. Bell, 1998 (following Fex and rejecting petitioner's argument that he satisfied Interstate agreement on detainers act requirements when he delivered notice to prison warden whom petitioner asserted was statutory agent of court), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 826, 120 S. Ct. 77, 145 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1999); United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 374 (2d Cir.) (following Fex and explaining that "the Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that the IAD is to be read literally"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 859, 119 S. Ct. 143, 142 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1998); United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "invocation of Article III's 180-day time limit generally requires strict compliance with the Article's requirements"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1085, 142 L. Ed. 2d 689, 119 S. Ct. 833 (1999); United States v. Collins, 90 F.3d 1420, 1426 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "Fex instructs us that the Interstate agreement on detainers act means what it says. and when it says that the prisoner must have his demand 'delivered to the . . . appropriate court,' that is what it means."); Nichols v. State, 651 So. 2d 76, 77-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (upholding lower court's refusal to dismiss indictment because record was devoid of evidence that court or prosecution received notice of request for final disposition); Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817, 820-21(Colo. 1997) (requiring strict compliance with IAD's procedural step that "the custodial official must forward the prisoner's request for a final disposition and a certification containing information regarding the prisoner's incarceration to the appropriate court and the prosecuting officer");