In Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1998) 524 U.S. 116 118 S. Ct. 1890, 141 L. Ed. 2d 102, petitioners were the personal representatives of three passengers killed when the former Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight KE007 after the plane strayed into Soviet airspace. The petitioners sought to recover for their decedents' predeath pain and suffering. They argued that although DOHSA did not permit such damages, general maritime law provided for a survival action allowing the decedents' estates to recover for predeath pain and suffering. ( Id. at p. 120 118 S. Ct. at p. 1893.) Petitioners contended that, because DOHSA was a wrongful death statute, it had no bearing on the availability of a survival action. ( Id. at p. 123 118 S. Ct. at pp. 1894-1895.) The airline, on the other hand, argued DOHSA provided the exclusive cause of action for deaths occurring on the high seas. ( Id. at p. 119 118 S. Ct. at pp. 1892-1893.) The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuit courts regarding the "availability of a general maritime survival action in cases of death on the high seas." ( Id. at p. 121 118 S. Ct. at p. 1893.) The Supreme Court agreed with the airline that DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for death on the high seas. "DOHSA expresses Congress' judgment that there should be no such cause of action for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering in cases of death on the high seas. By authorizing only certain surviving relatives to recover damages, and by limiting damages to the pecuniary losses sustained by those relatives, Congress provided the exclusive recovery for deaths that occur on the high seas. Petitioners concede that their proposed survival action would necessarily expand the class of beneficiaries in cases of death on the high seas by permitting decedents' estates (and their various beneficiaries) to recover compensation. They further concede that their cause of action would expand the recoverable damages for deaths on the high seas by permitting the recovery of nonpecuniary losses, such as pre-death pain and suffering. Because Congress has already decided these issues, it has precluded the judiciary from enlarging either the class of beneficiaries or the recoverable damages. . . . The comprehensive scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision . . . which limits the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress' 'considered judgment,' citation on the availability and contours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions; rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision. . . . In sum, Congress has spoken on the availability of a survival action, the losses to be recovered, and the beneficiaries, in cases of death on the high seas. Because Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages." ( Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 123-124 118 S. Ct. at p. 1895.)