In Douglas v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 415, a witness, Loyd, who had previously been convicted for his participation in the attempted murder charged against the defendant, refused to answer questions. The prosecutor "produced a document said to be a confession signed by Loyd. Under the guise of cross-examination to refresh Loyd's recollection, the prosecutor purported to read from the document, pausing after every few sentences to ask Loyd, in the presence of the jury, 'Did you make that statement?' Each time, Loyd asserted the privilege and refused to answer, but the prosecutor continued this form of questioning until the entire document had been read. The prosecutor then called three law enforcement officers who identified the document as embodying a confession made and signed by Loyd. Although marked as an exhibit for identification, the document was not offered in evidence." (Id. at pp. 416-417, ) Loyd's purported confession stated that he and the defendant planned to shoot at some trucks on a highway but that the defendant was the one who actually did the shooting. (Id. at p. 417, fn. 3.) The court held that the alleged statement and the witness's refusal to testify "created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true." (Douglas, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 419.) The court also held that although the prosecutor's "reading of the alleged statement, and the witness's refusals to answer, were not technically testimony," the prosecutor's reading of the alleged statement "may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that the witness in fact made the statement." (Ibid.) Because those inferences could not be tested by cross-examination, the quasi-testimony violated the confrontation clause. (Douglas, at pp. 419-420.) In Douglas v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 415, the prosecution called the defendant's co-defendant (who had previously been tried and found guilty) as a witness against the defendant. The witness, who planned to appeal his conviction, invoked the Fifth Amendment, but the trial court found he had no privilege and ordered him to answer. The high court did not decide whether the witness had properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, finding it sufficient for purposes of deciding the confrontation clause claim "that no suggestion is made that the witness's refusal to answer was procured by the defendant . . . ." (Douglas v. Alabama, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 420.)The witness persisted in refusing, whereupon the prosecution purported to read from a document said to be the witness's confession, asking after every few sentences if the witness had made the statement. Each time the witness refused to answer. The prosecution later called as witnesses several law enforcement officers, who identified the document as the witness's confession; the confession was not offered in evidence. (Douglas v. Alabama, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 416-417 (hereafter Douglas).) Douglas decided that the defendant's inability to cross-examine the witness as to the alleged confession "plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause." (Douglas, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 419.) The witness's alleged statement that defendant fired the shotgun "constituted the only direct evidence that he had done so," and "coupled with the description of the circumstances surrounding the shooting, this formed a crucial link in the proof both of defendant's act and of the requisite intent to murder." (Ibid.) While the prosecution's questions and the witness's refusal to answer "were not technically testimony," the prosecution's reading "may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that the witness in fact made the statement; and the witness's reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true." (Ibid.) The high court concluded: "This case cannot be characterized as one where the prejudice in the denial of the right of cross-examination constituted a mere minor lapse. The alleged statements clearly bore on a fundamental part of the State's case against petitioner. The circumstances are therefore such that 'inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant.'" (Douglas, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 420.)In Douglas v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 415, the high court found a violation of the Confrontation Clause where the prosecutor, purportedly for the nonhearsay purpose of refreshing co-defendant Loyd's recollection, read to the jury Loyd's alleged confession after he asserted the privilege against self-incrimination, then called officers to authenticate the confession. (Douglas, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 416-417.) The high court concluded that although the prosecutor's reading of the alleged confession was "not technically testimony," the co-defendant's "reliance on the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true." (Id. at p. 419.) In addition, the testimony of the police officers "enhanced the danger that the jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of Loyd and Loyd's refusal to answer as proving the truth of Loyd's alleged confession." (Id. at p. 420.) Under these circumstances, the court held that "petitioner's inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause." (Id. at p. 419.) In Douglas v. Alabama, after a co-defendant invoked the right against self-incrimination, the solicitor read into evidence his statement, which identified the defendant on trial as the perpetrator. Id. at 416-417. The solicitor paused after every few sentences to ask the co-defendant, "did you make that statement?" Each time the co-defendant asserted the privilege and refused to answer. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's "inability to cross-examine the co-defendant as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 419 (I). The Court explained that although the reading of the statement and the ensuing refusals to answer were not technically testimony, the solicitor's reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that the co-defendant in fact made the statement; and the co-defendant's reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true. Since the solicitor was not a witness, the inference from his reading that the co-defendant made the statement could not be tested by cross-examination. Similarly, the co-defendant could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him. Douglas, supra at 419 (I). The Court also noted that the opportunity to cross-examine the officers to whom the statement was made was inadequate to remedy the violation of the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 419-420 (I).