In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the defendants were charged with the sale of marijuana. Following their arrest, they exercised their right to remain silent after they were given Miranda warnings. (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 611-612.) At their respective trials, the defendants testified that they only tried to purchase the marijuana, and the seller had "framed" them. (Id. at pp. 612-613.) On cross-examination, the prosecutors asked the defendants why they had not told the frame-up story to the police officer who arrested them and gave them the Miranda warnings. (Doyle at p. 613.) The United States Supreme Court held in Doyle that the use for impeachment purposes of the defendants' silence at the time of arrest, after they received Miranda warnings, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (Doyle at p. 619.) Noting that silence in the wake of Miranda warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of the Miranda rights, the Doyle court reasoned that "while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings." (Doyle at p. 618.)In Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, the defendant was charged with selling narcotics. At the time he was arrested, the defendant gave no statement, but at trial he testified he had been framed. The prosecutor, on cross-examination, asked the defendant if he told the officer who arrived at the scene what had happened, which he hadn't. The court rejected the State's argument that the defendant's post-arrest silence was important because it contradicted the exculpatory story the defendant told at trial. (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 618.) Using for impeachment purposes the defendant's silence at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "While it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that the silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." (Doyle, at p. 618.) The United States Supreme Court held that due process prohibits the government's use of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes. The rationale for such a prohibition is that "it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." Id., at 618. The United States Supreme Court subsequently made clear, however, that due process is not violated by the prosecution's impeachment of a defendant's testimony by reference to the defendant's pre-arrest, or post-arrest, but pre-Miranda silence. Fletcher v. Weir (1982), 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 ("In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand"). In Doyle v. Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court held that it is "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." During closing argument, the assistant prosecuting attorney referred to the testimony of Police Officer Will Robbins. Officer Robbins had accompanied the Northside victims to the hospital to complete his investigation. While at the hospital, he saw Thomas, who had already been read his Miranda rights. Officer Robbins knew Thomas personally and told him that his father would be angry with him. Officer Robbins testified that Thomas had responded that he was not worried about his father, but was instead concerned about his mother's reaction. In closing argument, the assistant prosecuting attorney offered this comment on Thomas's failure to then proclaim his innocence: "When he's laying in the hospital under arrest for these terrible crimes, shooting of an 83 year old lady on Christmas night, he doesn't say, 'God, you got it all wrong. I was in the car with Keno and these two guys, I don't know who they are, but they got in the car. Gosh, I shook the one guy's hand.' He didn't say that. What does he say? 'My mom's going to kill me.' Defense counsel says, 'Oh, that doesn't mean anything.' Well, yeah, it does. By itself, maybe not. But with all of this evidence, it sure does." The United States Supreme Court held that post-Miranda silence may not be used against a criminal defendant where the defendant's silence was induced by Miranda warnings. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240. Specifically, the Court stated, "We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. In Doyle, the defendants' Miranda advisements were immediately followed by the defendants' silence; there was no intervening waiver of rights and/or police questioning. Doyle observed, "Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested. Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." Id. at 617-618. Doyle holds that the prosecution may not, consistent with due process and fundamental fairness, use postarrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial. The United States Supreme Court held "the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 619.) The Court explained: "The warnings mandated by Miranda, as a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, require that a person taken into custody be advised immediately that he or she has the right to remain silent, that anything he or she says may be used against him or her, and that he or she has the right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested. . Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." (Doyle, supra, at pp. 617-618.)