In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a statement made by one prisoner to another; this statement implicated both the declarant and the defendant in a murder. The Supreme Court held that the admission of this statement did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation, even though the declarant was not available as a witness at trial. According to the Court, the "statement was spontaneous, and it was against the declarant's penal interest to make it." In Dutton v. Evans, the defendant and two accomplices were charged with the brutal murder of three police officers. The trial court admitted evidence of an extrajudicial statement made by an alleged accomplice to a cellmate. The statement was, "'If it hadn't been for the defendant we wouldn't be in this now.'" ( Id., at p. 77.) The evidence was admitted under Georgia's broad coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule ( id., at p. 78). The lead opinion in Dutton (four justices) held that under the circumstances, admission of the hearsay evidence did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation because the particular statement was not "crucial" or "devastating" ( id., at p. 87), and because there were sufficient "indicia of reliability" to warrant admission of the evidence ( id., at pp. 88-89). The concurring opinion by Justice Harlan concurred in the result (an affirmance of the conviction) but said the issue was one of due process rather than confrontation. Four justices dissented, arguing the defendant's confrontation rights had been violated. The lead opinion in Dutton gave the following reasons why the evidence in question was sufficiently reliable to be admissible without cross-examination: "First, the statement contained no express assertion about past fact, and consequently it carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight. Second, the declarant's personal knowledge of the identity and role of the other participants in the triple murder is abundantly established by other evidence. It is inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown that the declarant was not in a position to know whether or not the defendant was involved in the murder. Third, the possibility that the declarant's statement was founded on faulty recollection is remote in the extreme. Fourth, the circumstances under which the declarant made the statement were such as to give reason to suppose that he did not misrepresent the defendant's involvement in the crime." ( Dutton v. Evans, supra, 400 U.S. at pp. 88-89.)