In Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, Enmund was the driver of the getaway car in an armed robbery of a dwelling whose occupants were killed by Enmund's accomplices when they resisted. (Id. at pp. 783-784) In deciding the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbid imposition of the death penalty "on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed" (Enmund, supra, at p. 797), the California Supreme Court emphasized that the focus had to be on the culpability of Enmund himself, and not on those who committed the robbery and shot the victims. (Id. at p. 798.) "Enmund himself did not kill or attempt to kill; and, ... the record ... does not warrant a finding that Enmund had any intention of participating in or facilitating a murder.... Thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the victims. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment." (Ibid.) The defendant Enmund's accomplices killed two people during an armed robbery at a farmhouse, while Enmund waited nearby in the getaway car. Enmund was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The Enmund decision reversed that sentence. It held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the death penalty for a defendant "who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." (Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 797.) Enmund stressed that the critical issue under the Eighth Amendment is the individual culpability of the defendant. As the defendant neither killed nor intended to kill, his culpability could not be equated with that of the actual killers. (Enmund, at p. 798.) The goals of deterrence and retribution were not served by imposing the death penalty on a robber who neither killed nor intended to kill, as crime statistics showed that killing is very rare during a robbery, and unintentional killings rarely result in the death penalty.In Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, two defendants robbed and fatally shot an elderly couple. Enmund was not the actual killer and was not present during the killings. Rather, he waited in a nearby get-away car 200 yards away from the home in which the murders took place. He was convicted of aiding and abetting a robbery and felony murder and was sentenced to death. The nation's high court held Enmund's punishment was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his role in the offenses and that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty on an aider and abettor for whom there was no evidence he killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill or contemplated that someone would be killed. (Id. at p. 788.) In so concluding, the Enmund court observed: "The question before us is not the disproportionality of death as a penalty for murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for Enmund's own conduct. The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on 'individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence,' . . . which means that we must focus on the 'relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender.' Enmund himself did not kill or . . . intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed . . . . This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment." (Id. at p. 798.) The Court held a defendant who drove the getaway car for a robbery wherein the robbery victims were shot could not be sentenced to death because he did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend for the death to occur. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784-85, 787, 798. The Court reasoned: Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the victims. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798. The Court expressly did not reach the secondary question of "whether the degree of Enmund's participation in the killings was given the consideration required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787 n.4. The United States Supreme Court said that a defendant who was merely a getaway driver in an armed robbery was not an active participant who shared the killers' intent such that his tangential role would support a special circumstance felony-murder finding sufficient to justify a death penalty. (Enmund, supra, at p. 801; Tison, supra, at p. 782.)