In Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, the defendant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law for stealing three golf clubs priced at $399 each, as a petty theft with a prior conviction for theft. (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 18, 20 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) His criminal history included convictions for theft, grand theft auto, petty theft with a prior, battery, burglary, possessing drug paraphernalia, appropriating lost property, possessing a firearm, and trespassing. (Id. at p. 18.) The defendant was convicted of grand theft based on his taking three golf clubs worth $ 399 each. The court imposed a life term under the Three Strikes law. The defendant's criminal history spanned from 1984 to 1999 and included misdemeanor and felony convictions for petty theft, auto theft, battery, burglary, robbery, possession of drugs, trespass, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Again, the United States Supreme Court did not find the sentence unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court upheld a 25-year-to-life sentence under the California three strikes law for a defendant who shoplifted golf clubs worth about $ 1,200 with prior burglary and robbery convictions. The court confirmed that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the federal Constitution contains a narrow proportionality principle that prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences, but that successful challenges outside the context of capital punishment are exceedingly rare. (Id. at pp. 20-21) The Court stated: "When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice. To the contrary, our cases establish that 'States have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals.'. Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment." (Id. at p. 25.) As Justice O'Connor explained in her lead opinion, "recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment." (Id. at p. 25.) In considering the gravity of the offense, the high court looked not only to Ewing's current felony, but also to his long criminal felony history, stating "any other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions. In imposing a three strikes sentence, the State's interest is not merely punishing the offense of conviction . . . 'it is in addition the interest . . . in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law." (Id. at p. 29.) The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge where the defendant was convicted of a "wobbler" and given a third strike life sentence for theft-related crimes. (Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 77; Ewing, at pp. 17-20.) In Ewing, the defendant was convicted of grant theft and sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, after stealing a set of golf clubs. His prior strikes included three residential burglaries and a robbery. (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 18-20.) Appellant had five prior serious felony convictions when he was convicted in the present matter for the theft of video games. His sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his crime and is justified by the State's interest in deterring recidivist felons. (Id. at pp. 29-30.)The Court concluded the defendant's sentence of 25 years to life for commercial burglary under California's Three Strikes law was not grossly disproportionate to the offense and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Ewing, at p. 28.) Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the court, held the defendant's sentence was "justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by the defendant's own long, serious criminal record." (Ewing, at pp. 29-30.) The United States Supreme Court considered whether a sentence of 25 years to life under California's Three Strikes law violated the Eighth Amendment. Ewing was convicted of grand theft for shoplifting three golf clubs valued at $ 1,200. He had previously been convicted of four serious felonies, including a robbery and three burglaries stemming from a single case. (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 17-18, 20.) In addition to the serious felony convictions, Ewing's criminal record included numerous theft related convictions, and convictions for drug possession, battery, burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, and trespassing. (Id. at p. 18.) The Supreme Court concluded that Ewing's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment, reasoning that "Ewing's sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record." (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 29-30.) The Court noted that although Ewing's sentence was a long one, "it reflected a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated." (Id. at p. 30.)The United States Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a third strike sentence of 25 years to life for a defendant who shoplifted three golf clubs and had previously committed three first degree burglaries and one first degree robbery. A majority of the court concluded that in noncapital cases, the Eighth Amendment either contains only a narrow proportionality principle (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy) or that it contains no proportionality principle at all (Justices Scalia and Thomas). (Id. at pp. 20, 31.) Under the narrow proportionality principle recognized by the plurality, the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the offense and the resulting sentence, and does not mandate comparative analysis within or between jurisdictions. (Id. at p. 23.) "'Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.'" (Ibid.) In weighing the gravity of the defendant's offenses, both his criminal history and his current felony must be considered. (Id. at p. 29.) The Ewing plurality noted that, outside the capital context, successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence are exceedingly rare. (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 21.) Without comparing Ewing's sentence with the punishment for other crimes in California or with the punishment for the same crime in other states, the court found that his sentence was not grossly disproportionate, but was instead "justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record." (Id. at pp. 29-30.) The court upheld a Three Strikes sentence for a nonviolent offense, shoplifting three golf clubs worth $ 1,200. (Id. at pp. 28, 31.) In conducting a proportionality analysis, the court weighed not only the gravity of defendant's current offense "but also his long history of felony recidivism." (Id. at p. 29.) It noted the purpose of the Three Strikes law is not merely punishing the current offense but also "'dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.'" (Ibid.) Based on defendant's recidivist history, which included a robbery and three residential burglaries, the court concluded defendant's sentence of 25 years to life was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Ewing, supra, at pp. 30-31.) The Supreme Court adhered to this restraint in addressing the constitutionality of a 25-year-to-life sentence under the Three Strikes law for a relatively minor theft offense. Ewing was charged with stealing three golf clubs--a crime that was subject to prosecution as a felony or a misdemeanor. The offense was prosecuted as a felony and Ewing was convicted. The trial judge declined to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor and, because Ewing admitted to having been convicted of four "strike" offenses (e.g., three burglaries and one robbery), he was sentenced to 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law. (538 U.S. at pp. 19-20.) Following the approach in Rummel, Ewing engaged in a limited proportionality review. The court first explained the manner in which an appellate tribunal is to assess the gravity of an offense for purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis. "In weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism." (Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 29.) In this regard, between 1984 and 1999, Ewing had been convicted of "numerous misdemeanor and felony offenses, served nine separate terms in either jail or prison, and committed most of his crimes while on probation or parole." (Id., at p. 30.) Ewing then, in conducting a limited proportionality review, considered the gravity of the offense in light of the legislative objective behind the Three Strikes law and the severity of the punishment imposed. "To be sure, Ewing's sentence is a long one. But it reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated. The State of California "was entitled to place upon Ewing the onus of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State.' Ewing's is not 'the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' " (Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 30.) The plurality opinion, signed by three justices, upheld a three-strikes sentence of 25 years to life for grand theft. It explained: "When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice." (Id. at p. 25 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) With respect to the particular defendant, it noted: "In weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism." (Id. at p. 29.) It concluded: "Ewing's sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record." (Id. at pp. 29-30) In rejecting the defendant's challenge, Justice O'Connor, writing for a three-Justice plurality, stated: "In weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. Any other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions. . . . To give full effect to the State's choice of this legitimate penological goal, our proportionality review of Ewing's sentence must take that goal into account." (Id. at p. 29.) The sentence, the plurality concluded, was "not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment . . . ." (Id. at pp. 30-31.) Two justices, Justices Scalia and Thomas, agreed with the plurality that Ewing's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment, but wrote separately to express the view that a proportionality principle cannot be "intelligently applied." (See id. at p. 31 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); id. at p. 32 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).)