Faretta v. California

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the court held that the Sixth Amendment implies a right of self representation. The right to choose from among available attorneys seems a corollary to the Faretta rationale. The high court (at p. 821 45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 573-574) said: "An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense." The Supreme Court held a criminal defendant not only has the right to the assistance of counsel, but also "has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 807 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 566.) The decision in Faretta was based on three interrelated arguments: the history of the right of self-representation since the founding of the United States, the structure of the Sixth Amendment, and respect for the individual. The highest court held a defendant in a criminal trial has a right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to represent himself if the decision is knowing and intelligent and the defendant waives the benefits of counsel. A timely and unequivocal request of a defendant to represent himself, made with an appreciation of the consequences and in advance of trial, must be granted. (Faretta, at pp. 832-836 45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 580-582). The United States Supreme Court held that the state may not "constitutionally impose a lawyer upon . . . an unwilling defendant." The defendant possesses the right "personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'; ( Id. at p. 834.) Faretta, however, requires a proper showing that the defendant waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a "knowing and voluntary" manner: "When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.)