In First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), the Supreme Court identified three types of disagreement that may occur in an arbitration: who should have the primary power to determine arbitrability, whether the dispute is arbitrable, and who should prevail on the merits. Id. at 942. In considering the first type of disagreement, the Court was concerned that a party entering into an arbitration contract might not focus on who would determine arbitrability, which might force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they had thought a court would decide. Id. at 945. Accordingly, the Court held that, when the parties dispute whether the arbitrator has authority to decide arbitrability, the trial court should not assume that the parties agreed the arbitrator could decide his or her own jurisdiction but should require "clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so." Id. at 944. The Court recognized with approval a court's hesitation "to interpret silence or ambiguity on the 'who should decide arbitrability' point as giving the arbitrators that power." Id. at 945. The Court held that appellate courts should uphold a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but review the court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. at 947-48. The Court held that the question whether the arbitrators or the courts have the primary power to determine arbitrability depends on whether the parties agreed to submit the question of arbitrability itself to arbitration. The Court explained: "When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally (though with a qualification we discuss below) should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. The relevant state law here, for example, would require the court to see whether the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the arbitrability issue to arbitration. "This Court, however, has added an important qualification, applicable when courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators should decide arbitrability: Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did so. In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the question 'who (primarily) should decide arbitrability' differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question 'whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement'--for in respect to this latter question the law reverses the presumption. See Mitsubishi Motorsv. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. 614 at 626, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 105 S. Ct. 3346 ('Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration')." 514 U.S. at 944-945. The Court also explained why the question "who determines arbitrability" is treated differently from the entirely separate question whether there is an agreement to arbitrate: "the . . . question . . . 'who (primarily) should decide arbitrability' . . . is rather arcane. A party often might not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers. And, given the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the 'who should decide arbitrability' point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide." 514 U.S. at 945. The United States Supreme Court addressed the standards of review under the FAA on two issues: (1) how a trial court should review an arbitrator's decision that the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, and; (2) how a court of appeals should review a trial court's decision confirming or refusing to vacate an arbitration award. In Kaplan, Manuel Kaplan's wholly owned investment company, MKI, had signed a workout document containing an arbitration clause with First Options after the 1987 stock market crash. While Mr. and Mrs. Kaplan had also signed other documents in relation to the workout, none of those signed by them contained an arbitration clause. First Options tried to compel the Kaplans individually to arbitrate, and the Kaplans filed, with the arbitrators, their objections that their dispute with First Options, as opposed to that of MKI, was not arbitrable. The Court held that courts, in determining whether the parties have agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability itself to arbitration, should not assume that the parties agreed to "arbitrate arbitrability" unless the evidence is clear and unmistakable that they have so agreed. On this question, the presumption on review opposes arbitration.