In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), two officers wearing badges boarded a bus. One officer was wearing a zipper pouch containing a pistol. The officers asked Bostick for his ticket and identification. The ticket and identification matched and were returned. The officers explained they were looking for illegal drugs and asked for consent to search his bags. Bostick was advised that he had the right to refuse consent. He consented and officers found cocaine. (Bostick, supra, at pages 431-432.) The Florida Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that the sheriff's department's program of routinely and randomly boarding buses and asking to search passengers' bags constituted an unconstitutional seizure. In adopting the per se rule, the Florida Supreme Court found the following argument persuasive: "Bostick insists that this case is different because it took place in the cramped confines of a bus. A police encounter is much more intimidating in this setting, he argues, because police tower over a seated passenger and there is little room to move around. . . . Bostick maintains that a reasonable bus passenger would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances of this case because there is nowhere to go on a bus. Also, the bus was about to depart. Had Bostick disembarked, he would have risked being stranded and losing whatever baggage he had locked away in the luggage compartment." (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at page 435.) The issue in Bostick was "whether a police encounter on a bus of the type described necessarily constitutes a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." The Supreme Court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court erroneously adopted a per se rule. The error occurred "in focusing on whether Bostick was 'free to leave' rather than on the principle that those words were intended to capture." The court stated, "When police attempt to question a person who is walking down the street or through an airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable person would feel free to continue walking. But when the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.Here, for example, the mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus does not mean that the police seized him. Bostick was a passenger on a bus that was scheduled to depart. He would not have felt free to leave the bus even if the police had not been present. Bostick's movements were 'confined' in a sense, but this was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue was coercive." (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at pages 435-436.) The Bostick court found INS v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210 to be dispositive: "At issue in Delgado was the INS' practice of visiting factories at random and questioning employees to determine whether any were illegal aliens. Several INS agents would stand near the building's exits, while other agents walked through the factory questioning workers. . . . There was no seizure because, even though the workers were not free to leave the building without being questioned, the agents' conduct should have given employees 'no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer.'" (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at page 436. ) Bostick determined the "'free to leave'" test did not apply to a passenger on a bus whose movement was limited by a factor that had nothing to do with police conduct. Instead, the test was "whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at page 436.) The Supreme Court did not decide whether Bostick had been seized because the trial court made no express findings of fact and the state high court based its holding on one fact only--that the encounter took place on a bus--rather than on the totality of the circumstances. In so concluding, however, Bostick noted the following important factors. "The police specifically advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse consent." "At no time did the officers threaten Bostick with a gun." (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at page 432.) "There is no doubt that if this same encounter had taken place before Bostick boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal, it would not rise to the level of a seizure." "Where the encounter takes place is one factor, but it is not the only one." "A refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." "The cramped confines of a bus are one relevant factor that should be considered in evaluating whether a passenger's consent is voluntary." Bostick remanded to the Florida Supreme Court. (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at page 440.) In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), the U. S. Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida which had established a per se rule that, due to the cramped confines of a bus, police officers could not approach bus passengers at random and ask them questions without violating the Fourth Amendment. The defendant in Bostick argued that the Florida court's rule was correct and that an encounter with police on a bus is much more intimidating than an encounter in other public places because "police tower over a seated passenger and there is little room to move around." Id. at 435. The defendant relied on language in cases such as Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 US 567, 573 (108 SC 1975, 100 LE2d 565) (1988), which stated that "a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not 'free to leave.'" Id. The U. S. Supreme Court found the defendant's argument unpersuasive, reasoning: When police attempt to question a person who is walking down the street or through an airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable person would feel free to continue walking. But when the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter. Id. at 435-436. Rather, the proper inquiry is "whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Id. at 436. The U. S. Supreme Court further clarified that the inquiry entails considering "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter," and that the same standard applies "to encounters that take place on a city street, in an airport lobby," or on a bus. Id. at 439-440. The Supreme Court noted that in some situations the "free to leave" test is not capable of literal application. In Bostick, the defendant was a passenger on a bus when the police asked to inspect his ticket and identification. The defendant argued that a reasonable bus passenger would not feel free to leave under the circumstances, because there was nowhere else to go on the bus, and because he risked being stranded if he left the bus that was about to depart. The Supreme Court concluded that under these circumstances the defendant would not have felt free to leave the bus even if the police had not been present. Therefore, the court explained that the constraint on his movement said nothing about whether the police conduct was coercive. "Accordingly, the 'free to leave' analysis on which the defendant relies is inapplicable. In such a situation the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter." Id. at 400.