In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the prosecutor expected a co-defendant to testify at trial. Based on this expectation, the prosecutor included a summary of the co- defendant's anticipated testimony in his opening statement. 2 Later, when the co-defendant was called as a witness, he asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal, Frazier claimed that his right to confrontation was violated because the prosecutor had given the jury a summary of the co-defendant's anticipated testimony --a summary that "may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony" that Frazier was not able to cross-examine. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue was "not an easy one", the Court ultimately concluded that, under the circumstances of Frazier's case, the jury could reasonably be expected to follow the trial judge's admonition "to limit its consideration to the evidence introduced during trial", and to set aside information presented during opening statements that did not conform to the evidence. The Supreme Court noted that the information concerning Frazier's co-defendant's anticipated testimony did not come into the trial through another witness's testimony, but only in the prosecutor's opening statement. The jury was instructed that the statements of counsel were not evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor's description was "no more than an objective summary of evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to produce", and it "[was] not touted to the jury as a crucial part of the prosecution's case". Rather, the prosecutor's description "took only a few minutes to recite", and it was "sandwiched" between major portions of the opening statement. The prosecutor gave an opening statement in which he told the jury that defendant confessed to committing the charged murder. Additionally he included a summary of testimony he expected to present from the codefendant. The summary was not emphasized in any particular way, nor was it a vitally important part of the prosecution's case. Only a paraphrase of the statement was placed before the jury. After acknowledging that the question posed was not an easy one, the Frazier decision found the trial court's curative admonition sufficient under these facts. But the court went on to say that "It may be that some remarks included in an opening or closing statement could be so prejudicial that a finding of error, or even constitutional error, would be unavoidable." (Frazier v. Cupp, supra, 394 U.S. at p. 736.)