In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea that a parolee has an absolute constitutional right to counsel representation at a parole revocation hearing. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, recognized that there existed situations where the presence of counsel at parole revocation hearings would be both undesirable and unnecessary. The only occasions whereby the right to counsel at parole revocation hearings is of federal constitutional magnitude is where fundamental fairness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires counsel. 411 U.S. at 790. In cases such as petitioner's where the only violation of parole charged is a new criminal conviction, the Gagnon Court held counsel is constitutionally required only where there is substantial justification or mitigation which would render revocation inappropriate and where the justification and mitigation is complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. Id. at 790-91. The United States Supreme Court held the following minimum due process requirements apply in a probation revocation proceeding: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him; (c) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; (f) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. Id. at 786. The United States Supreme Court rejected the contention that a state is constitutionally compelled to provide counsel for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases (id. at pp. 787-790) but the court did hold that "there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness--the touchstone of due process--will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Id. at p. 790.) Fundamental fairness presumptively requires the provision of counsel "where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present." (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court held that the Morrissey v. Brewer standards apply to probationers as well as parolees: "The state does not contend that there is any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, nor do we perceive one. Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer . . . . " (Id. at 782.) Consequently, the decision in Gawron was based almost entirely upon Morrissey, a decision defining the legal rights of parolees. In Gawron, we described the interests at stake when an individual has been arrested: The Morrissey court emphasized the importance of holding a hearing "while information is fresh and sources are available." However, we believe a second and even more fundamental policy underlies Morrissey and subsequent decisions. An individual may not be deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed liberty without cause. Detention is to be avoided when no probation violation has occurred. As the Court has stated: Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. (Gawron, 113 Idaho at 336, 743 P.2d at 989.)