In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), the driver of a 1987 Honda Accord was seriously injured when the vehicle collided with a tree. She and her parents filed a lawsuit in a federal district court, alleging under common law that her injuries had resulted from the vehicle's negligent and defective design because it lacked a driver's side air bag. The district court dismissed the lawsuit based on express preemption, and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but did so based on implied preemption. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 334 U.S. App. D.C. 273, 166 F.3d 1236 (D. C. Cir. 1999). Although all the Supreme Court justices agreed federal law did not expressly preempt the lawsuit, the majority held that the lawsuit "conflicted with the objectives of FMVSS 208 ... and is therefore implicitly pre-empted by the Safety Act." Geier, 529 U.S. at 866, 120 S. Ct. at 1917, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 922. In so holding, the majority rejected the dissent's position that FMVSS 208 set "a minimum airbag standard." Id. at 874, 120 S. Ct. at 1922, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 927. The Court observed that the Department of Transportation's comments accompanying the promulgation of FMVSS 208 made clear that the standard deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices. Those choices would bring about a mix of different devices introduced gradually over time; and FMVSS 208 would thereby lower costs, overcome technical safety problems, encourage technological development, and win widespread consumer acceptance--all of which would promote FMVSS 208's safety objectives. Id. at 875, 120 S. Ct. at 1922, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 927-28. The Court then reviewed the history of FMVSS 208 and the considerations that had shaped the standard and determined that it "deliberately sought variety--a mix of several different passive restraint systems." Id. at 878, 120 S. Ct. at 1924, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 930. The Court observed that FMVSS 208 did so "by setting a performance requirement for passive restraint devices and allowing manufacturers to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies to satisfy that requirement." Id. The Supreme Court determined that the saving provision makes it clear that the express preemption provision does not preempt common-law tort actions. However, the Supreme Court found that "nothing in the language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations" ( Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., supra, 529 U.S., at 869). Thus, the Supreme Court proclaimed that in adjudicating whether a common-law action conflicts with FMVSS 208, ordinary preemption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent, apply ( id. at 874.) The Supreme Court resolved a split between the federal circuit court of appeals and state courts as to whether the Safety Act and the FMVSS expressly or impliedly preempt claims that a car manufacturer made an inappropriate choice in selecting a restraint system where the manufacturer selected one of the three options provided for in FMVSS 208.