In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), police officers asked a married couple for permission to search their marital residence. One spouse refused permission, while the other spouse consented to the search. Id. at, 164. Police searched the house, and the nonconsenting spouse was later charged with possession of cocaine based on evidence the police obtained during their search. Id. at, 164. At trial, the nonconsenting spouse moved to suppress the evidence as a "product of a warrantless search of his house unauthorized by his wife's consent over his express refusal." Id. at, 164. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the consenting spouse "had common authority to consent to the search." Id. at, 164. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "one occupant may not give law enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search." Id. at, 164. The United States Supreme Court held that the search of a couple's shared residence could not be based on the wife's consent when the husband was physically present and expressly refused consent. Randolph, supra at 120. The Randolph Court drew an admittedly "fine line" between two scenarios, stating: "if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out." Id. at 121. The Randolph Court's statement that police officers are not required to take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already received. Randolph, supra at 122. The high court observed: "The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained." (Id. at p. 106.) The question before the court was "whether such an evidentiary seizure is likewise lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent." (Ibid.) The court answered that question in the negative, holding that "a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him." (Ibid.) If a physically present defendant objects to the warrantless search of his home, and a present third party with apparent authority to consent to a search gives consent, a warrantless search by the police will be found to be unreasonable, hence unconstitutional (id. at 106). In Randolph, the police were investigating a domestic incident involving an estranged married couple. The wife volunteered that her husband had a drug problem and that there were "items of drug evidence' in the house" (id. at 107). The police officer asked the defendant if he could search the home, the defendant refused (id.). With that, the police officer turned to the defendant's wife and asked for her consent to search the home, which "she readily gave" (id.). The police conducted a search and cocaine was found (id.). The police officer took the evidence and under the direction of the District Attorney, applied for a search warrant (id.). The Supreme Court held that the search of the defendant's home was unreasonable because "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident" (id. at 120). The Randolph decision seems not to have abrogated the long held position that third party individuals, with common authority to consent to a warrantless search, may still allow the police to conduct a warrantless search of shared premises, when there is not a present objecting person who has refused to consent (Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109).