In Gilbert v. Homar (1997) 520 U.S. 924, a police officer employed by a state university was immediately suspended after he was charged with felony possession of marijuana. (Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 926-927.) In balancing the Mathews factors, the Supreme Court held that "the State has a significant interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who occupy positions of great public trust and high public visibility, such as police officers." (Gilbert, at p. 932.) Moreover, in addressing the issue of the risk of an erroneous deprivation, which the court characterized as the factor most important to resolution of the case (id. at p. 933), the court stated that the criminal procedures of arrest and formal charge by complaint "serve to assure that the state employer's decision to suspend the employee is not 'baseless or unwarranted,' . . . in that an independent third party has determined that there is probable cause to believe the employee committed a serious crime." (Id. at p. 934.) In Gilbert v. Homar, a Pennsylvania police officer employed by a state university was arrested and charged with a drug-related felony. The university immediately suspended him without pay. Relevant to the disputed issues here, the suspended police officer eventually sued his employer claiming due process entitled him to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a pre-suspension hearing. At the District Court level, the state university won summary judgment. Upon appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and held that due process categorically precluded the employer from suspending its employee without pay unless the latter is granted a pre-suspension hearing. The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Third Circuit, found the absence of a pre-suspension hearing under these circumstances not to be a violation of due process. It is critically important to note that in Gilbert, the police officer's suspension without pay was pursuant to the Governor's Executive Order, which expressly authorizes and mandates that a state employee be automatically suspended without pay "'as soon as practicable after being formally charged with ... a felony.' 4 Pa. Code 7.173 (1997) . . ." (520 U.S. at 933.) It is true that Gilbert held that the police officer was not constitutionally entitled to have a pre-suspension hearing (and similarly not fatal to the larger denial of due process issue being raised vis-a-vis the scope and breadth of a post-deprivation hearing). Nonetheless, Associate Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, astutely noted that its purpose would have been to establish whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the truth of the charges against an employee and support the temporary suspension without pay of short duration, which were found without a pe-suspension hearing when the police officer was arrested and charged with a felony. Further, Gilbert makes clear that once the police officer's criminal charges were dropped shortly after his temporary suspension without pay, the police officer's right to a prompt post-deprivation hearing became paramount because "the risk of erroneous deprivation increased substantially . . ." (520 U.S. at 935.) The Supreme Court noted that "public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process. " (Id. at pp. 928-929.) In Gilbert, the plaintiff was employed as a police officer at a state university. While at the home of a friend, he was arrested by state police during a drug raid. Later that day, the plaintiff was charged with various drug offenses. Upon learning of the arrest, the university administration immediately suspended the plaintiff without pay. A month later, the university demoted the plaintiff to the position of groundskeeper. After the criminal charges were dropped, the university voluntarily gave the plaintiff back pay. The plaintiff then brought suit, alleging that the university had violated his right to due process by suspending him without a hearing. In deciding against the plaintiff, the Supreme Court stated: "'We have rejected the proposition that due process always requires the State to provide a hearing prior to the initial deprivation of property.' . . .. . . To determine what process is constitutionally due, we have generally balanced three distinct factors:'First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest.'" (Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 931.) After applying the three factors, the Gilbert court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a predeprivation hearing and had not been denied due process.