In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1650, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, 35 (1991), the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application. In answering the question in the affirmative, the Court first recognized that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, and stated that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Id. at 26, 111 S.Ct. at 1652, 114 L.Ed.2d at 37 The Court then concluded that the party, having made the agreement to arbitrate, should be held to it unless Congress has evinced an intention to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. "If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purpose." Ibid. The Court held that plaintiff's claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. 621 to 634, could be subjected to mandatory arbitration under an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff, a financial services manager, was required to register as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); in the application he agreed to submit to arbitration any claims between him and his employer required to be arbitrated under the NYSE rules, which covered his employment and its termination. Ibid. The Court stressed the public policy in favor of arbitration and noted that arbitration did not require the employee to forgo any substantive rights, but merely changed the forum in which the claim would be heard. Id. 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S. Ct. at 1651, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 37. The Court scrutinized the ADEA and found no "inherent inconsistency" between the "important social policies" it advances and "enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims," reasoning that both judicial resolution of claims and arbitration "can further broader social purposes." Id. 500 U.S. at 27-28, 111 S. Ct. at 1652, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 38. The Court rejected plaintiff's argument, also advanced by plaintiff here, that arbitration procedures are inadequate, as based upon unfounded "'suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants'. . . ." Id. The Court held that the plaintiff's claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. 621 to -634, may be subjected to mandatory arbitration the Supreme Court stated that "mere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context." The Court found that there was "no indication . . . that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause. . . ." Id. at 33, 111 S.Ct. at 1656, 114 L.Ed.2d at 42. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20 111 S. Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (Gilmer), the Supreme Court appeared to create a conflict with its own holding in Gardner-Denver. As the court subsequently explained, however, the conflict is more apparent than real. In Gilmer, the court held that a securities representative whose registration application with the New York Stock Exchange provided for compulsory arbitration of controversies with his employer could be required to arbitrate a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) (ADEA) rather than initially filing suit. ( Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 23-24 11 S. Ct. at pp. 1656-1658, 114 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 35-36.) Even though the ADEA, like title VII, furthers important social policies and not merely individual employees' rights, the court found that Congress had not precluded the compulsory arbitration of claims under the ADEA. (Gilmer, at p. 29 111 S. Ct. at pp. 1653-1654, 114 L. Ed. 2d at p. 39.) The court also brushed aside Gilmer's challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures for resolving ADEA claims: "In our recent arbitration cases we have already rejected most of these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims. Such generalized attacks on arbitration 'rest on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be claimants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.' " ( Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 30 111 S. Ct. at p. 1654, 114 L. Ed. 2d at p. 39.) The court specifically rejected the "view" of Gardner-Denver that arbitration was "inferior to the judicial process for resolving statutory claims": "That 'mistrust of the arbitral process' . . . has been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions. 'We are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.' " (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 34-35, fn. 5 111 S. Ct. at p. 1656, 114 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 42-43.) In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) the plaintiff argued that his claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 were not subject to arbitration under the FAA but conceded that nothing in the statute's text or legislative history supported his argument. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Rather, he argued three reasons why the ADEA irreconcilably conflicted with the FAA: (1) the statute's important social purposes; (2) its provisions for informal dispute resolution, and (3) the potential for disparity in bargaining power between employers and employees. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-33. The Supreme Court rejected all three arguments and held that even age-discrimination claims can be subject to binding arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court noted that the ADEA imposes a similar prerequisite. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27. Specifically, a claimant must file a charge with the EEOC before pursuing a claim in court, and the EEOC must engage in "informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." 29 U.S.C. 626(b). The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the ADEA's expressly providing for "out-of-court dispute resolution" is not inconsistent with allowing arbitration under the FAA. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29; See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385, 134 L. Ed. 2d 6, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996) (" A statute conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction for a certain class of claims does not necessarily require resolution of those claims in a federal court."). Similarly, enforcing the parties' binding arbitration agreement is not inconsistent with the Magnuson-Moss Act's providing an out-of-court informal dispute settlement mechanism.