In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, the high court held that if a defendant is competent to stand trial and makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's right to counsel, federal due process does not require the trial court to determine, by a standard higher than competency to stand trial, whether the defendant is competent to represent himself or herself before the court permits self-representation. Godinez acknowledged that states are free to adopt competency standards more elaborate than the trial competency formulation, but concluded those additional competency standards are not required by federal due process. The Supreme Court articulated for the first time the standard for determining competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to assistance of counsel. The court specifically rejected 'the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky v. United States (1960) standard.' " (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1112-1113.) "The competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." (Godinez, supra, at p. 399.) The Supreme Court concluded that "requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements." (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 402.) Under Godinez, "California is free to adopt 'more elaborate' standards than the Dusky standard for determining competence to waive the right to counsel but is not required to do so." The Court considered whether a criminal defendant who sought to waive his right to counsel and enter a plea of guilty should be held to a higher competency standard than the competency level required to stand trial. (509 U.S. at p. 391.) The court answered the question in the negative, "rejecting the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard." (Id. at p. 398 at p. 331.) Godinez involved a defendant's ability to proceed on his own to enter a plea, not his ability to conduct trial proceedings. Godinez held that a state could permit a "gray-area defendant" to represent himself. It did not tell a state whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself. The Court held that "the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Therefore, a finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is also a finding that a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel and assert the right of self-representation. ( Id. at pp. 396-402.) The court stated that although there is no higher standard of competency for a defendant's waiver of counsel and assertion of the right to self-representation, "a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver of the right to counsel must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted." (Id. at p. 402.) The court noted: "The purpose of the 'knowing and voluntary' inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced." (Id. at p. 401, fn. 12.) The Court held that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to a jury trial is the same as the competency standard. The competency standard is "whether the defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' " (Id. at p. 396.) The standards are the same because "there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights." (Id. at p. 399.)