In Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371, 112 S. Ct. 466 (1991), the Court considered whether a charge in a criminal case, allowing the jury to find guilt under either of two counts, only one of which had support in the evidence, violated the due process clause. The Court held it did not, following over a century of criminal jurisprudence. Id. at 49-51. Griffin did not make any new criminal law, nor did it purport to extend its view of constitutional requirements to civil procedure. The dissent here acknowledges as much, but nevertheless suggests that Griffin's logic should apply equally in state civil procedural questions as in federal constitutional law. (O'Neill, J. dissenting). But the United States Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that a different reversible error analysis applies in civil cases. See Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 493, 28 L. Ed. 822, 5 S.Ct. 278 (1884); See also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29-30, 8 L. Ed. 2d 305, 82 S. Ct. 1130 (1962); United N.Y. & N.J. Sand Hook Pilots Assoc. v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 618-19, 3 L. Ed. 2d 541, 79 S. Ct. 517(1959); Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 78-79, 51 L. Ed. 708, 27 S. Ct. 412 (1907). The Court observed: Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory . . . submitted to them is contrary to law . . . . When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence.