In Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, a man convicted of manslaughter sued various defendants under 42 United States Code section 1983, asserting they had engaged in unlawful acts that had led to his arrest and conviction. (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 478-479.) The inmate brought an action under 42 United States Code section 1983 ( 1983) against county prosecutors and a state police investigator, alleging that his conviction violated his civil rights. The petitioner had been convicted in an Indiana state court and sought damages in federal court under 42 United States Code section 1983 against state prosecutors and an investigator. He contended that the defendants "had engaged in an 'unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation' leading to his arrest; 'knowingly destroyed' evidence 'which was exculpatory in nature and could have proved his innocence'; and caused 'an illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure' to be used at petitioner's trial." (Id. at p. 479.) The court analogized to the common law tort action of malicious prosecution, which requires termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. This requirement avoids collateral attacks on the conviction, and avoids inconsistent resolutions arising from the same facts. The court held: 'The hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to section 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.' (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 486.) Thus, in order to maintain a claim for damages under section 1983 for harm caused by actions, which, if they were unlawful, would render a conviction invalid, the plaintiff must prove the conviction had been reversed or otherwise expunged. (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 486-487.) The U.S. Supreme Court held that damages were not available unless the criminal procedure had been terminated in plaintiff's favor. The court noted that section 1983 '"creates a species of tort liability' . . . and to determine whether there is any bar to the present suit, we look first to the common law of torts. " (Heck v. Humphrey, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483.) The court then went on to state "the common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here because . . . it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process." (Id. at p. 484.) Next, citing Carpenter v. Nutter (1899) 127 Cal. 61, the court iterated the rule that "one element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. " (Heck v. Humphrey, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 484.) The United States Supreme Court held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983." (Heck v. Humphrey, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 486-487, ) The test is "whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . . But if . . . the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed . . . ." (Heck v. Humphrey, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 487, ) The court explained that, due to "concerns for finality and consistency" (Heck v. Humphrey, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 485), "civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . . ." (Id. at p. 486.)The Supreme Court decreed, in pertinent part, that"in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal," or that it would "otherwise be invalidated." The Supreme Court further stated that such a claim would not otherwise be cognizable under the statute, and that if the district court were to determine that "a judgment [on the 1983 claim] in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," it must dismiss the case until the litigant can prove that the conviction has been so invalidated. Judge Hummel determined that the evidence that was seized on and surrounding Stegemann's property was the very basis of the pending criminal indictment. "Thus, in finding that the warrant was invalid in this civil suit, the Court would be challenging the exact vehicle through which the named law enforcement agencies found the drugs, guns, and money which compromise the evidence in the criminal indictment...were Stegemann to succeed on any theory espoused above, he would necessarily call into question the validity of the theory behind his pending criminal prosecution." The Court found that all claims concerning the search warrants and the wiretaps would necessarily imply the invalidity of the indictments and prosecution, and that they were all Heck barred. With respect to Stegemann's 14th Amendment claims concerning the unlawful destruction and seizure of property, Judge Hummel held that the federal courts do not provide redress for deprivation of property if there is an adequate state court remedy for the plaintiff, and that Stegemann could proceed via Article 78, and seek monetary damages in the Court of Claims for any claims against New York State. Finally, the Court noted that the complaint named several New York defendants, and that Stegemann was a citizen of New York, and thus he had not established complete diversity, depriving federal court of jurisdiction. The court compared 1983 claims to the common law tort of malicious prosecution, the first element of which is favorable termination of the prior proceeding, and determined that both were implicated by the "hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments. . . . (Id. at p. 486.) In recognition of this principle, the court ruled that "to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." (Id. at pp. 486-487.)