Henderson v. Morgan

In Henderson v. Morgan (1976) 426 U.S. 637, 644-645 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253, the accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder in a New York court but was not advised by his attorney or the trial court, at any time, that an intent to cause death was an essential element of that offense. Defense counsel did not explain to defendant the element of intent, and at the plea hearing there was no discussion of the elements of the crime, no indication that the nature of the offense was ever discussed with defendant, and no reference of any kind to the requirement of an intent to cause death. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Henderson court found: "There is nothing in this record that can serve as a substitute for either a finding after trial, or a voluntary admission, that defendant had the requisite intent. Defense counsel did not purport to stipulate to that fact; they did not explain to him that his plea would be an admission of that fact; and he made no factual statement or admission necessarily implying that he had such intent. In these circumstances it is impossible to conclude that his plea to the unexplained charge of second-degree murder was voluntary." (Henderson, supra, 426 U.S. at page 646). In Henderson, the government argued that invalidating the guilty plea on that basis would invite a flood of collateral attacks on pleas, since frequently the record will not contain a complete enumeration of elements of the offense to which the accused pleads guilty, but the court found those fears exaggerated. The court explained: "Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." (Henderson, supra, 426 U.S. at page 647.) However, in Henderson, it was established that the intent element was not explained to defendant, and defendant's low mental capacity provided a reasonable explanation for counsel's oversight. Since the defendant "did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, his plea was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law." (Henderson, supra, 426 U.S. at page 647.)