Hill v. Lockhart

In Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a defendant's "claim that his plea was 'involuntary' as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney supplied him with information about parole eligibility that was erroneous." (Id. at p. 56.) The U.S. Supreme Court observed in Hill: "We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and indeed such a constitutional requirement would be inconsistent with the current rules of procedure governing the entry of guilty pleas in the federal courts. See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11(c); Advisory Committee's Notes on 1974 Amendment to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11, 18 U.S.C.App., p. 22 (federal courts generally are not required to inform defendant about parole eligibility before accepting guilty plea)." (Id. at p. 56.) The U.S. Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart determined that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." (Id. at p. 58.) The court stated: "Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' " (Id. at p. 56.) It also explained: "The second, or 'prejudice,' requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." (Id. at p. 59.) The Supreme Court held the two-part test pronounced in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel, noting the second part of that test is modified. (Hill v. Lockhart, supra, at pp. 58-59.) Under the modified test, a defendant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) his or her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; (2) he or she suffered prejudice from counsel's deficient performance, i.e., "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." (Id. at p. 59) As in Strickland v. Washington, the prejudice standard for plea negotiations is intended to determine whether, but for counsel's constitutionally deficient performance, the outcome of the plea process would have been different. The court went on to require that in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id., 59." The Hill court, in discussing the "prejudice" inquiry in guilty plea cases, indicated that the assessment of whether an "ineffective" counsel may have "deprived" a petitioner "will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial." Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 59. It went on to state that "as we explained in Strickland v. Washington. . . these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the 'idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.'" Id., 59-60. As the Court explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel 'may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann v. Richardson Id., at 267, 93 S.Ct., at 1608." Id. at 56-57, 106 S.Ct. at 369; State v. McReynolds, 5th Dist. No. 2004-CA-00023, 2005 Ohio 37 at P 17. In sum, The Court in Hill, supra, held that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. 366. The first inquiry in whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364; Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. In other words "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. However, a different outcome at the plea stage but for counsel's errors is constitutionally insignificant if the ultimate result that was reached was neither unfair nor unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180. In Hill v. Lockhart, the United States Supreme Court clarified application of this standard to test the validity of guilty pleas where it is claimed that counsel failed to investigate or discover exculpatory evidence: "In many guilty plea cases, the 'prejudice' inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error 'prejudiced' the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.