Holloway v. Arkansas

In Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, three defendants were charged with having committed rape and robbery and were appointed the same counsel. At a pretrial motion, defense counsel moved for appointment of separate counsel based upon his assertions, as an officer of the court, that there existed a conflict of interest. Specifically, the attorney mentioned that if one or two of the defendants took the stand, he would be unable to cross-examine them. The motion was denied. Although defense counsel renewed his motion during various points of the trial, it was again summarily denied by the trial judge. Subsequently, at trial, all three defendants took the stand against counsel's advice. Based on the fact that the lower court callously ignored defense counsel's expression of concern, the high court ruled that defendants were deprived of their constitutional right to assistance of counsel. ( Holloway v. Arkansas, supra , 435 U.S. at pp. 484-486.) In addition, the court determined that an erroneous failure to grant separate counsel is the type of mistake which is reversible per se. ( Id. , at p. 489 55.) Nevertheless, Holloway noted that, ". . . appellate courts have differed on how strong a showing of conflict must be made, or how certain the reviewing court must be that the asserted conflict existed, before it will conclude that the defendants were deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel." ( Id. , at p. 483.) The court expressly reserved decision on this issue until a later occasion. ( Id. , at p. 484.) The United States Supreme Court observed: "Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, in this case it may well have precluded defense counsel for Campbell from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another . . . . The mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters." ( Id., at pp. 489-490 55 L.Ed.2d at p. 438.)