Hudson v. United States

In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) the United States Supreme Court developed a multi-factor balancing tool to determine whether an administrative sanction should be characterized as criminal or civil regulatory. The purpose of the test was to determine when a statute which purports to provide a civil remedy (either on its face, or via legislative intent) is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. The Court explained that "the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of any additional sanction that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment." Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-99. "The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings." Id. at 99. The Court in Hudson outlined the following "useful guideposts" in determining whether a punishment is criminal: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. A court must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect, as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Id.