In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court ruled that although a juvenile delinquency hearing need not conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, such a hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. . . . The right to adequate notice of the charges is among the essentials of due process and fair treatment that the In re Gault court held applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. . . . Notice must be given to the child and his parents or guardian . . . in writing . . . at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation and must contain the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing. . . . The Court explained that 'it is of no constitutional consequence--and of limited practical meaning--that the institution to which a child is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. . . . In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase "due process." The United States Supreme Court granted juveniles facing possible commitment many of the constitutional rights enjoyed by their adult counterparts, including the right to counsel and appointed counsel if indigent. Before permitting a waiver of counsel, the court has a duty to make an inquiry to determine that the relinquishment is of "a fully known right" and is voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made. Gault at 42. A voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must affirmatively appear on the record. In re: Kuchta (Mar. 10, 1999), Medina App. No. 2768-M, 1999 Ohio App, unreported.