In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, while the defendant was awaiting trial on charges of attempted murder, battery, criminal recklessness, and theft, his competency was brought into question several times. Twice he was found to be incompetent, and he spent several months in a state hospital. When his condition improved, he was found competent to stand trial. Just before his trial was set to begin, he asked to represent himself and requested a continuance. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant stood trial while represented by counsel. The jury found him guilty of some charges but could not reach a verdict as to two charges, and the state elected to retry him on those charges. Before his retrial, the defendant again asked to represent himself. Citing the defendant's "lengthy record of psychiatric reports," the trial court denied the request. It found that the defendant was competent to stand trial but was not competent to represent himself. On retrial, the defendant was convicted of the remaining two charges. (Edwards, supra, 128 S.Ct. at pp. 2382-2383.) On appeal, the Indiana intermediate appellate court and Indiana Supreme Court found reversible error in the denial of defendant's request to represent himself. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the constitution does not forbid a state from applying different standards for evaluating whether a defendant is competent to stand trial and whether he is competent to represent himself. (Edwards, supra, 128 S.Ct. at pp. 2387-2388.) Thus, Edwards does not require a state to establish a higher threshold for determining competency for self-representation. Rather, Edwards established a permissive rule only; in other words, the court in Edwards held that separate standards were not unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 2388.) The Court held, "The Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves." (Id. at p. 2388.) In reaching this conclusion, the court differentiated the mental capacity necessary to stand trial and the capacity necessary to represent oneself. The Edwards court concluded, "We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take a realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so." (Edwards, supra, 128 S.Ct. at pp. 2387-2388.) The court refused to set a strict standard for assessing severe mental illness that would render a defendant incapable of conducting the trial proceedings.