In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn. (2005) 544 U.S. 550, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed, for the first time, the government speech argument that had been raised in both Glickman and United Foods. The court described the dispositive question as "whether the generic advertising at issue is the Government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny." (Johanns, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 553, italics added.) This case arose under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) (Pub.L. No. 99-198, 1601 (Dec. 23, 1985) 99 Stats. 1597). The Johanns majority delineated two categories of cases where First Amendment challenges to allegedly compelled expression have been sustained: "true 'compelled-speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government; and 'compelled-subsidy' cases, in which an individual is required by the government to subsidize a message he disagrees with, expressed by a private entity." (Johanns, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 557.) The court then noted "We have not heretofore considered the First Amendment consequences of government-compelled subsidy of the government's own speech." (Ibid., italics added.) However, the court pointed out, "'compelled support of government'--even those programs of government one does not approve--is of course perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest." (Id. at p. 559.) The Beef Act announced a federal policy of promoting the marketing and consumption of beef. The Beef Act directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement this policy by issuing a Beef Promotion and Research Order (Beef Order) and by appointing a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef Board). At issue in Johanns were beef promotional campaigns designed by the operating committee of the Beef Board (Operating Committee). These campaigns were funded by mandatory assessments on beef producers. (Johanns, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 553.) The Johanns majority held that the beef promotional campaigns were the government's own speech. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the promotional campaigns' message was effectively controlled by the federal government itself. (Johanns, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 560.) First, Congress directed the creation of the promotional program and specified that the program should include "'paid advertising, to advance the image and desirability of beef and beef products.'" (Id. at p. 561.) Second, "Congress and the Secretary have also specified, in general terms, what the promotional campaigns shall contain ... and what they shall not ... ." (Ibid., citations omitted.) "Thus, Congress and the Secretary have set out the overarching message and some of its elements, and they have left the development of the remaining details to an entity whose members are answerable to the Secretary ... ." (Ibid.) Although the Secretary did not write the ad copy himself, the Secretary appointed half the members of the Operating Committee and all of the Operating Committee's members were subject to removal by the Secretary. (Id. at p. 560.) Additionally, all proposed promotional messages were reviewed by Department of Agriculture officials both for substance and for wording, and some proposals were rejected or rewritten by the department. Finally, Department of Agriculture officials attended and participated in the open meetings at which proposals were developed. (Id. at p. 561.) Therefore, the court held, the Beef Board and the Operating Committee could rely on the government speech doctrine to preclude First Amendment scrutiny. (544 U.S. at p. 562.) Finding that the promotional campaigns were effectively controlled by the government, the court declined to address whether the Operating Committee was a governmental or a nongovernmental entity. (Id. at p. 560, fn. 4.)