Kansas v. Crane

In Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407, the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that Hendricks required the State of Kansas "always to prove that a dangerous individual is completely unable to control his behavior." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 411, 415.) In so doing, the court observed that "the Constitution's safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not always best enforced through precise bright-line rules. For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment." (Id. at p. 413) The Supreme Court noted the federal Constitution requires a distinction to be drawn between a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment and other criminals dealt with in criminal proceedings. To warrant civil commitment, the person must manifest "a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior." (Id. at pp. 412-413.) The court noted "'inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." (Id. at p. 413.) The Court held Hendricks did not require the state to prove that a dangerous individual has a total or complete lack of control over his behavior. (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 411.) As the court explained, " Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) referred to the Kansas Act as requiring a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it 'difficult, if not impossible, for the dangerous person to control his dangerous behavior.' The word 'difficult' indicates that the lack of control to which this Court referred was not absolute." (Ibid.) In the court's view, most severely ill people retain some ability to control their behavior, and therefore an insistence on an absolute lack of control requirement would "risk barring the civil commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities." (Id. at p. 412.) On the other hand, the court held that the Constitution did require some "lack-of- control" determination; without giving any particular meaning to that phrase, it concluded Constitutional safeguards required only that the People present "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 411, 413 "It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior".) Such a requirement, the court explained, was necessary to maintain the distinction, emphasized in Hendricks, between a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from dangerous offenders convicted in ordinary criminal proceedings. The court said: "The presence of what the 'psychiatric profession itself classified . . . as a serious mental disorder' helped to make that distinction in Hendricks. There, an important factor that helped distinguish a serious mental disorder was "a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 412-413.) Serious difficulty in controlling behavior, "when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." (Ibid.) In addition, the court noted that in cases where lack of control is at issue, " 'inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 413.) "The Constitution's safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not always best enforced through precise bright- line rules. For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment. For another, the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law. Consequently, we have sought to provide constitutional guidance in this area by proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally stated constitutional standards and objectives as specific circumstances require." (Id. at pp. 413-414.) The court refrained from setting any "bright-line rules" as to the definitions of mental illness, disorder or abnormality that can invoke civil commitments. (Ibid.) In Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407, the Court clarified that " Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control" and observed that "most severely ill people--even those commonly termed 'psychopaths'--retain some ability to control their behavior." "It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual or other offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." (Id. at p. 413.) The Court emphasized that the requisite "'inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision," in part because psychiatry itself is an ever-advancing, inexact science that is not designed to mirror legal categories. (Ibid.) Moreover, the Court eschewed the label "volitional" impairment to identify that the requisite lack of control. (Id. at pp. 414-415.) "Here, as in other areas of psychiatry, there may be 'considerable overlap between a . . . defective understanding or appreciation and . . . an ability to control . . . behavior.' Nor, when considering civil commitment, have we ordinarily distinguished for constitutional purposes among volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments." (Id. at p. 415.) While the Court declined to address whether "confinement based solely on 'emotional' abnormality would be constitutional," it clearly rejected a standard that turned specifically on a lack of "volitional" control. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court considered the Kansas SVPA in the case of a defendant diagnosed with exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. Specifically, the question at issue was whether a difficulty in controlling one's dangerous behavior was an element that the state must prove if the disorder was "emotional" rather than "volitional." (Id. at pp. 411, 414-415.) The court held that, while an absolute inability to control one's behavior could not realistically be required, it is necessary for the state to prove the defendant has "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." (Id. at p. 413.) Impairment of volitional control was adopted in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) "to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." (Ibid.) Simply categorizing a mental disorder as "emotional" rather than "volitional" did not alter the constitutional analysis. (Id. at p. 415.) As Crane noted, "Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment 'from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.' That distinction is necessary lest 'civil commitment' become a 'mechanism for retribution or general deterrence'--functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 412.)